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This paper is an examination ot oonf1ioting v1ews 
regarding ~mer1oan defense po11oy whioh surfaoed ln a debate 
durlng the winter and spring ot 1950-51 between the Truman 
Adminlstration and its supporters and a group of oonserva­
tiv.e Republioans. The research prob1em lnv<?1ved unrave1ing 
the debate's manlfold lssues, determlning its outoome, and 
analysing the impaot of that outoome on the future ot 
American foreign po11oy, part10ularly 1n Asla. 
The debate's prlnoip1e issues oentered around Amerloan 
defense of Europe versus defense ot Asla and the re~ianoe on 
ground troops rathe~ than on sea and a1~ power; The 
- I 
I 
I . 
I 
2 
Administration, while believing the United States should 
help repel tbe Commun1st invasion ot South Korea, also 
advooated sending additional troops to Europe. Republican 
cr1tics d1sagreed, argu1ng there Was no overt Communist 
threat in Eu~ope, only 1n As1a, and Amerioan efforts there 
Should be redoubled. 'Furthermore, they claimed that What-
'\: 
ever detense ot Europe, . was nec~ssary oould best be accom-
pl1shed through the use ot naval and air power ,"not the 
I 
1nfantry. 
The 1mmed~ate result ot the depate was victory tor the 
Adm1n1,s.tration. , A maJor~~y ot s,enators was convinoed that 
add1t10~al Amer1c~ troops were needed in Europe, and the 
Senate passed a resolution expressing that opin1on 1n early 
April, 1951, ostens1bly ending the debate. The v1ctory was 
short-11ved, however. The debate had repercuss10ns at the 
'polls in 1952 and helped sweep the Republicans 1nto ott1ce. 
The ultimate outcome ot the debate was to br1ng the con-
servat1ve argum~nts to the tore and remold American toreign 
po11cy so that i,t conformed to those views. 
T~e information used in this paper Was colleoted from 
books and oQntemporary periodioals, newsp.apers, and govern-
ment publications. The only leading conservative critic 
still 'living, William F. Knowland, did not respond to a let-
• 
ter requesting clarifioation ot statements he made during 
the, debate. The 'memoirs ot Pres1dent Truman and Dean 
Acheson, his Secretary' of State, received special attent1on. 
i 
I 
Works on and by Senator Robert A. Taft, the ~ublio Papers o! 
!he Presidents of the United States, The New York T1mes and 
The Times of London, and ~~ Department ot State Bullet1n 
were_partioularl1 useful. One potentiall1 important primar,y 
souroe,'Q paper written by the Nat10nal Seour1ty Oounc1l 1n 
1950, remalns classit1ed and was thuB unavailable. 
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From Korea oame reports 
s1tuation oall­
Something smaoked ot treason 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUOTION 
_The w1nter ot 1950-51, round the United States envel­
oped 1n pessimism, it not aotual despa1r. A senae ot 
impending disaster seemed to.permeate the nation. The mood 
was self-generating: eaoh new orisis, real or tancied, pro­
v1ded treSh tuel tor another outburst or national paranoia; 
the tear 1n turn brewed new cr1ses. 
For most Amer10ans the threat ot Commun1sm, 1n all its 
myriad torms, Was somehow .responslble tor the anxiety and 
susplolon whioh beset the oountry. T.nere seemed to be no 
end to the ·Oommunist conspiraoy." 
ot Amerloan armies belng Chased pell-mell down the pen­
insula by IhordesN ot Ch1nese Oommunists, a 
ing into questlon America's presence there in the tirst 
plaoe and also presenting the nagging puzzle ot how those 
likeable Chinese ever beoame disoiples ot Karl Mar.x. 
The answer to that, olaimed some, oould only be tound 
it the Department ot State were vigorously investigated by 
proper senatorial oomm1ttees. 
at Foggy Bottom. Alger Hiss had already been oonvicted ot 
I perjury. Owen Lattlmore had been linked vagUely with Mao 
~ 	 I 
I t ae-tung, and he was therefore suspeot. The name John 

I 

, 	 f Carter Vlnoentaroused assooiations w1th the loss otI
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China. l And the Seoretary of State, Dean Aoheson himself, 
had defended them all. IApparently, he ins1sted 'on surround-
1ng h1msel~ w1th a malignant mi11eu ot appeasers and trait~. 
From Europe' the' news was hardly more ~pt1m1stl0. Re-
ports kept indioating that the Red Army, with its 175 divi-
sions (or was it 225?) and 30,000 tanks (or was it 45,ooo?) 
was posed on the borders ot the satellites ready to strike 
and expand godles~ Oommunism onto the helpless p'eoples ot 
Western Europe. Yugoslavia, ~t was reported, Was to be 
.first choioe on St'a11n I s menu or conquest. T1 to would have 
to be supported. But so would Franoo. Indeed, it could 
only be expeoted that all of Western Europe would have to be 
proteoted trom the onslaught. 
Presumably, European manpower should proteot Europe. 
As armohair strategists eagerly po1nted out, even Yugoslav1a 
and Spain were not without d1visions: the tormer reportedly 
had th1rty while the latter oould scrape together twenty-
two. Further, 1t was noted that "Greece oould produoe and 
was wil11ng to produoe ten divis1ons •••• 12 And ot oourse 
there was always Britain and France. St1ll, would these 
torces really be enough? Would America have to 8uppl~' d1vi-
s1ons, too? But how could it, already invOlved With ASia 
lFor an exoellent analysis ot the Oarter affair see 
Ross Terr1ll, "When Amer10a -Lost- China: ,The Oase ot John 
Carter. V1noent,· The Atlantic, November, 1969, p~. 7g-S6. 
9thomas A. Dewey, "Enlarge North Atl$1lt10 Treaty,~. 
Vital Speeohes"M~~oh 1,1951, p. 292. 
. I 
: 
II 
and the hordes ot Ch1nese Oommuh1sts 1n Korea? From these 
quest10ns emerged the framework tor a oongressional,debate 
on th~ tuture ot Amer10an tore1gn pOlloy. 
Aotually, the ·great debate" as 1t oame to be,called 
was really one ot a serles that began ln the 18te 1940 l s 
with the Ohina questlon and continued on atterward wlth the 
MacArthur hear1ngs, the ~emol-Matsu oontroversy, and the 
role ot' Amerloan aid to Indochina. Although Euro,2ean 
detense oomposed a large measure ot the great debate the 
Far East, and'Amerioa's relat10n to 1t, ·was never tar from 
I 
I loenter stage. Indeed, tQP some the main event was the FarI. 
East; Europe to them remained on the periphery. 
I Still; it' otten seemed ditf1cult to pinpoint the nature of the debate. Adlai Stevenson onoe suggested -it 
I 
'I Awas mostly a debate about m1l1tary strategy and not fore1gn 
policy•••• n3 others, With the benefit of intervening 
years, have tound 1 t ,more complex,"" 
In short, the debates ot 1951-1952 thrashed out the 
premises which would govern Amer1can foreign pollcy 
tor at least the next deoade and a half. At the s1m­
'plest level, the arguments'pivoted on the question ot 
whether Asia should enjoy equal priority with Europe
in Amerlcan polioy. Overall, the debate was tar more 
complex. It beoame a pr1me example ot how over­
slmp11:t'led (often unquestioned) prem1ses ot one his­
torioal era oould, almost 1nev1tably, develop into 
apparently unrelated but tar-reao~g policies atteot­
1n~.11te and death 1n a later era. . 
3Adlai E. Stevenson, "There Are No G1braltars,1 Vital 
Speeches, February 15,1951" p.'2g7. . 
~alter LeFeber, Amerioa, Russ1a. and the Cold War, i~~-129~ (New York: John Wiler and Sons, 1967), pp. l~g-
, 
\ 
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Ohronologically, it is also diftioult to Bet an exaot 

date tor the beginning ot the debate. Certa1nly the Korean 

War had muoh to do w1 th 1 t • As the war began to sour tor 

the Un1t.ed States 1n the autumn ot 1950, it tended to have a 

oatalyt.10 ettect on national mood. RUmb11ngs 01' discontent 

1ncreased in late November and early Deoember as Ch1nese 

troops drove Amer1can torces out 01' North Korea and caused 

them to retreat well 1nto the southern port10n 01' the pen­
1nsula. The notion the troops would be -home by Chr1stmas' 

qu10kly d1ss1pated and.was replaced by a wave ot deteat1sm 

and m1strust. Much 01' this nat10nal anxiety developed 1nto 

I 
a ser10us quest1on1ng ot President Truman's 1ntent10n, which 
he had tirst announc'ed on September 9, to make • substant1al 
1l'lere:s.ees in the strength or the United States t'oreas to 1:e 
stat10ned 1n Weste~ Europe in the 1nterest 01' the detense ~ 
Q5or that area. But the Pres1dent's ~ntent1~ns toward 
orated 1n late November. Indeed, the Chinese 1ntervention 
was all the more reason to suspeot tla world-wide pattern 01' 
danger to all the tree nations ••• n and, consequently, 1t 
was now "more neoessary than ever that integrated torces 1n 
16Europe. under a Supreme Oommand be establiShed at onoe. In 
5u; S., Pres1dent, JlStatement by the PreSident Upon
Approving an Inorease in U.S. Forces in Western Europe~"
Sept. 9, 1950, PubliC Fa~ers 01' The Pres1dents of the united 
States: Harry: S. Truman (waShington: o. 8. GOvernment 
Yrlnting offioe, 1965), p. 626. 
6Ibid., "The Pres1dent's News Conference ot November 
30, 19~p. 72;. ' 
--
I' 
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m1d Deoember Seoretary of State Dean Aoheson flew to Europe 
to do Just that. 
In Oongress, 'however, some members reaoted to the 
Korean 'imbroglio, and the President's statements oonoern1ng 
the related posS1b1l1ty ot Oommun1st expans10n 1nto Western 
Europf3, With something Just short of pandemon1um. Senator 
Kenneth MoKellar, Demoorat of Tennessee, and then dean of 
the Senate, solemnly summed up the state of affa1rs 1n 
Oongress and 1n the nat1on: 
I have served 1n one or the other of the two Houses 
of Con~ess to~ a per10d of nearly 40 years. Dur1ng
that long per10d of ~1me I do not believe I have ever 
seen the Members ot th1s body and the Members of the 
other body, or the people generally, ever work1ng at 
suoh oross purposes. I do not be11ev~ I have ever 
seen them so or1tioal of one another. f 
McKellar h1mself was hardly an 1mpassive' bystander. 
Indeed, 1n h1s View the 1ssues be1ng debated reaohed truly 
momentous proport10ns: "Shall the greatest Oonst1tut10n 
ever wr1tten and the greatest government ever dev1sed by 
man· and freest and most suooessful and most prosperous 
people on earth, rema1n as presently set up; or are we to 
be taken over by Commun1sts who be11eve ne1ther 1n God nor 
mant uS 
" Senator McKellar's rhetor10 to the oon~rary, the 
lnf1dels were not yet at the gates. Neverth~less,' h1s 
7Xenneth'MoKellar, cited by Anon., "The 'Lame Duok' 
Sesslon Features Anxiety and Taxes,· Oongresslonal Dlges~, 
January, 1951, p. 1. 
SIbld.
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remarks reflected the oonfusion which resulted trom a runda-
m~ntal and ~lagu1ng question: by which gate would they 
str1ke' The Adm1n1stration I s response was to opt r.or a 
tlex1ble derense, one that would be capable or detend1ng 
Europe as well as Asia. This position was decr1ed by oppo-
nents in both parties who argued that the threat 1n Europe 
was remote wh1le the one 1n the Far East was real and 
immediate. Ooupled with th1s concern was the supposed dan-
ger, darkly h1nted at by so~e, that a t1tth oolumn was 
operating out ot the highest echelons ot government, and 1t 
was responsible tor many foreign policy decisions. SuCh 
views were 1n turn roundly attaoked as be1ng -isolat1onist' 
by pro-Adm1nistrat1on foroes. 
The 1solat1onist tag attached to the Admlnlst~atlonls 
or1tios offered a quick and neat label, but it d1d not ade-
quately define the 'opposit1on's views. ,To argue that the1r 
v1ews were simply a resurgenoe or Htrad.1~t·1onal isolationism· 
was to be guilty of.,.mouth1ng a vague genera11ty. Histor1an 
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. WaS more specific when he attempted 
to catalogue the group_ He tound that the isolationism ot 
an earlier era--that ot Senators Norris and Lafollette, tor 
example--tended to be "att1rmat1ve"whereas the 1solat1on1sm 
ot the present per10d was found to be "negative." He dif-
ferentiated the two by arguing that Mone was moved b~ hope 
tor America, the other by hatred ot Europe." Further, "one 
shunned Europe the better to oharige America; the other, the 
\ 
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The Atlantic, May, 1952, p. )5. 
7 . 

better to keep Amerioa trom cbang1ng. u9 "In Schlesinger's 
;View, then, there was someth1ng 1nherently mor.e repugnant 
about the new 1so1at1onism. 
Anxiet7 ot this sort among 11berals increased when 1t 
became evident to many 01' them that the proponents 01' the 
new is'olationism otten seemed to ofter no specific solutions 
to foreign po1101 problems other than to tire away at the 
hazy target 01' -traitors in WaShington. 1 Others professed 
to see the ,advooates 01' the new isolat10nism following a 
oourse that could ev~ntually lead to a "preventive" war-­
nuolear style. While'these v1ews may have had some valid1ty, 
they usually ta11ed to deal with the reasoning, suCh as it 
was, that lay behind the conservative position. 
9Arthur M. Schlesinger4 Jr., "The New Isolation1sm," 
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CHAPTER II: 
\ 
THE NEW ISOLATIONISM 
!rad1tiona~~oepte ot China 
Muoh oonserva~1V8 thinking 1n regard to Ch1na, and 
indeed allot tbe Far East, consisted o~ a curious blend ot 
histor1cal ~act With a smatter1ng of Realpolitik, a generous 
portion ot m1ss1onary zeal, a disoernible trace or nine-
teenth oontury bus1ness eth1c, and a s1zaable amount ot 
M1dwestern intuit1on. \fJOat emerged. was a polit1cal stew ot 
contusing and questionable content. However, since muc~ ot 
th1s oonoootion had been spoon-ted the American publio tor 
years, 1ts ingredients require a more careful examinat1on. 
F1rst ot all, many conservat1ves simply could not--nor 
did they w1sh to'--shake ott·~the propensity to view AS1a, 
espeo1ally Oh1na, with a speo1al nostalgic favorit1sm. Ch1na 
would always remain in their m1nds as that humble sleeping 
g1ant wh1ch could only be awakened by a slow and someWhat 
painful transfusion of cap1tal1sm and Ohr1et1an1ty. Only 
by follow1ng America's example would Ch1na ever progress. 
This beliet was so ingra~ned in a certain segment of the 
Amerioan publi0 that 1t literally beoame a torm of gospel. 
Senator Kenneth T. Wherry, for example, reportedly addressed 
a crowd in 19lJo: "With God's help, We will 11ft Shangha1 up 
9 
and up, ever up, untll lt ls Just llke.Kansas 01ty.l 
Whl1e dazed wonder would be the common reactlon to 
such an utterance today, lt was recelved wlth "Wild cheerlng­
ln 1940. Senator Wherr,y1s exhortatlon may have been some­
what ot-s classlc even tor that perlod, but lt nevertheless 
reflected the type ot lntormatlon and thlnklng whloh many 
Amerioans gulllbly aocepted concernlng Chlna. 
Undoubtedly muoh ot thls Was due to years ot reports 
sent back from Amerloan mlsslonarles ln the Orlent. Otten, 
ln tact, local churchee provlded the only 11nk between 
small-town Amerlca and Obrlstl~n progress ln tar-ott;~e1a. 
One authorlty has not ed: 
The Far East (lnoluding southeast Asla and Indla)
absorbed more Amerlcan Protestant mlssionaries than 
any other sectlon of the globe. The educatlon 
carrled on through the Protestant churches of the 
Unlted States to acquaint the 'supportlng constl tu­
ency Wlth what was belng done g~ve to milllons lnfor­
matlon, usually sympathetlc, about the peoples, c~l­
tures, and problems ot eastern and southern Asla. 
The tradltlonal economlc pollcles associatsd With the 
"Open Door" prlnclple also helped Amerlcans to adopt a 
patronlzlng attltude toward Chlna. Presumably, what wasI 	 I 
I good tor Amerloan buslness Was also good for Chlna, or at 
II 
 least eventually would be. Of course, Ohlnese merchants 

otten resent'ed thls notlon, and ocoaslonally Amerlcan lnt er­
, 	 t 
eats suttered local re~erees when rebe1110ns broke out. 
l I 
I lK,enneth T. Wherry, cited by' Erlc F. Goldman, The Cru­
cial Decade--and Atter (New York: Vlntage Books, 1960),
f ji;-116 \ 
~enneth Scott Latourette, The Amerloan Record in the 
Far East I 1945-1921 (New 'I.ork: T.n:eRacmlIlan oompany, 1953-). 
p. 12. 
I 
10 
po11oy ot "gunboat diplomaoy,. St1ll, as1de trom tollow1ng a 
the supporters ot Amer1can 1ntereets in Oh1na'never ser1­
ously suggested that Amer1ca go to war to detend those 1nter~ 
eats. 3 Our1ously, ~at developed as a result ot suCh th1nk­
lng was 1n tact a po11cy or oontrad1ct1on. As Professor _ 
Tang Tsou has noted: "While reluctant to pay a heavy pr1ce 
to promote her 1deals and to proteot her interests, the 
Un1ted States was unw1ll1ng to re11nqu1sh her princ1ples and 
her hope 01" tuture ga1ns.J4 Undoubtedly, th1s Was 1~ part 
due to the r1se and cont1nued rule 01" the Nat10na11st reg1me 
under Ch1ang Xa1-shek. As long as Oh1ang rema~ned in.power, 
I I 
} Amer1can eoonom10 1nterests seemed to be 1n l1ttle danger, 
due 1n large part to his dependence on Amer10an a1d. 
. Another Amer1can ~onoept ooncern1ng Oh1na developed 
dur1ng World War II when most 01" the Amer10an pub11c was 
if 
persuaded to aooept Oh1na as a IIgreat power." . or oourse 
Ohlna never really did belong 1n thls oategory, but such 
Ir1ot1on was neoessary 1n order to 1nsure her cont1nued par­
t101pat1on 1n t~e war aga1nst Japan. Pres1dent Roosevelt· 
.and his Seoretary ot State even made certa1n overtures sug­
I gest1ng that Ch1na would "be granted a h1gh plaoe among the 
i 
nat1ons" 01" the world at the oonolus1on 01".' the war.,S Wh1lel 
,. 3Tang Tsou, Amer1oa's Fa1lure 1n Ch1na {Ch1oago: The 
Un1vers1ty or Chioago' Press, 1963T, p. 25. 
i ~b1d.t 
­I 
j SHerbert Fe1si The Ch1na 'Tan~le {New York: Atheneum,I 1965) , p. 95.
, I I . j
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there were some off101als at h1gh levels ot government who 
held ser10us reservations about the pract1cality ot suoh a 
proposal, 1t was untortunately acoepted by most Amer10ans 
as a sens1ble and realizable goal. Th1s was part1cularly 
true ot conservatives who had long been enohanted by the 
poss1b111t1es ot Ch1na's rehab11itat10n and emergence as a 
world power, thanks to Amer1can ta1th and know-how. 
St111, there remained the occas10nal conservat1ve Who 
telt that Oh1na's 1mportance lay not 1n oommerce, Chr1s­
t1an1ty, nor as a potent1al great power. Rather, her 1mpor­
tance to the United States lay 1n her strateg10 10cat1on. 
Th1s 11ne ot reason1ng held that Amer1ca's.conoern tor 
Ch1na should be based solely on the secur1ty cons1derat1ons 
ot the Un1ted States 1tselt. A proponent ot' suoh th1nk1ng, 
Representat1ve Walter Judd, argued betore the Exeout1ve 
Club of Chioago in February ot 1951: 
It was not necessary that they should have a good
government 1n Oh1na. That was desirable, but wholly
seoondary. It d1d not necessar1ly need to be a 
demoorat10 government, an honest government, or an 
eff10ient government.· The key th1ng was that the 
manpower and the. reso~oe,s and the bas1s of Ohina 
be under Oh1nese tr1endly to the Un1ted States, and 
not under the ~ontro1 of potent1al enem1es ot the 
Un1ted States.b I 
Oongressman Judd's arguments are ot 1nterest tor several 
reasons. F1rst" they h1nt at some sort ot B1smarok1an 
soph1st1oat1on, a rather strange tack tor a man 
6Walter Judd, "How Can We Be So Stup1d" 
Speeohe~, March 1, 1951, p. 294. 
who had 
V1ta~ 
II 
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spent a good' port1on of h1s l1fe engaged as a m1ss1onary in 
China. It would norma.:L ~ be assumed that a former olergy­
man would not f1nd the not1on of' a good government in China 
to be a "wholly seoondary" oonsideration. Possibly such a 
disorepancy oould,be explained away by suggest1ng that 
Dr. Judd's eoolesiastical interests had simply g1ven way to 
a sense ot hard-hea~ed power poll tics. But what seems more 
llkely ls that here was an 'example 01' a pro-Chiang Republl­
f can who had beoome so worked up over the posslble fate of 
t his tavorite Asian regime that he was reduoed to employ1ng! 

I 
 argumen~s that were both oontradiotory and misle$d1ng. 
1 Dr. Juddls concern, however, was not wlth the type or man­
ner 01' argument he used: rather, he was only lnterested ln 
the United States' oontlnu1ng,to";both vlgorously support and 
enoourage the actions ot Oh1ang Kai-shak. It thls meant he 
was to become a~.,.praQtltioner ot Realpolltik, so be It. In 
essenoe,. then, while his arguments may have added a new 
degree 01' sophistry to the great debate, hls motives and 
reasonlng were muCh the same as those ot other conserva­
I t1ves. Unfortunately, they also reflected their weaknesses. 
I ~~e Hoover Thes1s 
I A's previously noted, opposl tion to the forelgn pollcy 
I 
I 
ot." the Truman Administrat10n mounted steadily atter the 
: I "loss' 01' Ohlna 1n 1949- Wlth the advent 01' the Korean War,
, i it momentarlly subslded owlng to the necesslty ot support­I I ing a President and country engaged 1n an Aslan war against 
13 
Communism. But when 1t became clear in November ot 1950 
tbat the war 1n Korea would not be Over by Chr1stmas and the 
I Pres1dent was ~ot go1ng to allow General MacArthur to bomb( 
I 
I 
J Ch1nese targets 1n Manchur1a, "OPpos1t1on once aga1n quickly 
mount ed. It,S tempo 1ncreased even more when it became appal;.­
I ent that Truman was determ1ned to send add1t10nal troops to 
Europe. Its eventual high water mark Was reached on 
I, I 
I 
t Deoember 20, 1950, when rormer Pres1dent Herbert Hoover 
\ 
de11vere~ a national radio address wh1ch 1s generally recog­
nized as the open1ng salvo in the "great debate ft ot the com­
ing months. In 1t can be found many' ot the 1ssues w1thI" 
I wh1ch most or the new isolat1on1sts could read11y 1dent1ty.
I A olue to Mr. Hoover's remarks can be gleaned trom his 
I repeated referenoes to the Un1ted States as "this Western 
Hem1sphere G1braltar 01' Western Civ111zat10n"--term1nology 
I that was to prov1de Adm1n1strat10n defenders with the oppor­
:bun1ty to cast1gate h1m for his "fortress Amer1oa" outlook. 
Bas1cally the Hoover G1bralter ph110sophy held that so long 
as the Pao1f1c Odean and Japan, Formosa and the Ph1l1ppines 
" 
remained as one front1er, and the Atlantic Ocean (along w1th 
Great Br1ta1n, "1t she w1shes to co-operate") rema1ned as 
the other, the United States would be guaranteed a defense 
posture that would be. suff1c1ent to her heeds. To +mplement 
,such ,a program, however, 1t would be necessary to lIarm ourI I 
I a1r and nava~ torces to the teeth.· (Hoover was to add in a later rad10 speeoh that 'th1s 'only made good sense s1nce Uthe 
f 
I , 
f j 
: 	I 
I 
I, 
I 
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whole Korean tragedy is developing proot that the way to 

punlBh aggressors ls rrom the air and sea and not by land 

, I larmies.")7 Oonversely, slnce Amerlca would no longer need 
to mainta1n.la~ge armles either on the mainland ot ASia or 
'in Europe, suoh roroes should be removed. For any ruture 
war ~slng large numbers or American ground troops would 
prove disastrous. Cautioned Hoover: 
We must face the tact that to commlt the sparse
ground roroes of ·the non-Oommunist natlons lnto a 
land war against this Oommunist land mass would be 
a war without a vlotory, a war Without a successtul 
po11t 10al t ermina 1. Any at tempt t 0 uke War on 
the Communlst mass by land,lnvaslon, through the 
qulcksands ot Ohlna, Indla [,J or Western Europe ls 
sheer tolly. That w~uld be the graveyard ot mll­
lions ot Amerloan boys and would end. in the exhgus­
t10n or this Glbraltarj at Western Clvllizat1on. 
I 	 • 
Hoover, apparently impressed by the Naz1 deteat at the 
hands ot the Red Army during World War II, repeatedly warned 
against American soldlers becom1:ng involved in a war agalnst 
a IIKremlin-direoted horde." This ooncern about employlng 
large numbers ot American gr'ound rorces ln almo at any ruture 
oontllct was Widely held by a number 01" the Adm1nlstratlon's 
opponents, '11" not by a sizeable portion or the Amerlcan pub­
110 itselt. It became, in taot, a sort 01" fundamental 
maxim: Amerlcan "boysa in large numbers simply could not be 
saor1f1ced 1n battles agalnst 1"aceless hordes capable 01" 
overpowering them w1th sheer numbers alone. 
7Herbert Hoover, aWe Should R~vlse Our Forelgn Pol­
ioles, n yltal Speeches', February 15, 1951, p. 264.. 
gHerbert Hoover, "Our National Pollcies 1n this 
Orls1s,· V1tal Speeches, January 1, 1951, p. 165· 
r
;. 
• 
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Du~ing the coming weeks, while Hoover both modif1ed 
and expanded hls thesls, many ot hls speeches cont1nued to 
deal wlth the specter ot Russlan and/or Chinese hordes. 
Gradually, however, the hordes were Jolned by new allles 
~ t 
factors he referred to as "General Space, General \~1nter and 
General Scorched Earth.n Any attempt to engage Russ1an or 
Chlnese armles would also have to reckon With these factors,
! { warned Hoover. 
l 
Some observers were to deteot another concern of 
I Hoover l s. He seemed not only to be worrled by the strategy 
of natlonal derense but also the cost ot It. Otten lti 
became dlfflcult to sort out hls prlorlt1es: defense agalnst1 
\ Commun1sm or defense against excesslve defense of Communlsm. 
I 
\ 
, l At tlmes Economlc conslderatlons detln1tely won out: 
'I 
1 The unbearable straln on our economlc system wllll 
I oome trom trylng to' do 'flve thlngs at the same time. 
I That ls, to malntain arm1es ln the Paolflc; to bulld 
up an alr toroe; a naval torce; to furnlBh munltlons 
to natlons wno are determlned to defend themselves; 
and beyond that to send land armies to E~rope. OurII 
l 
·economy cannot carry thls load tor long.~ 
The uproar over Hoover1s orlglnal speech or Deoember 
20 was both lnstant and nolsy. Admlnlstration supporters 
t 
I 
I were qulck ~o clalm that his lnterpretat10n ot what' Amerlcan 
t 
I foreign pollcy should be amounted to 11ttle more than old­
fashlonedr.lsolatlonlsm. (In later weeks Hoov~r and hls 
detenders were ,to be labeled "neo-lso1atlonlsts, II a term" 
9Herbert.Hoover, ·We Should Revlse Our Forelgn Pol­
101es," pp. 264-265. 
16 
accordln~ to one observer, that lms app~led to those wlshlng 
to flght ln Ohlna but not ln Europe.)lO Dean Acheson re­
marked. tbat any withdrawal of Amerlcan troops from Europe 
l-tould only Itenable the Soviet Union to make a qU10k conquest 
of the entire Eurasian l.a.nd mase" and,that would be "catas­
trophlc to the United States. ull Oonservatlves were just 
.I as qulck 1~ claim1ng Hooverl s message had been mlsinter­
; 
preteQ., perhaps intentlon,ally. Column1st Raymond. l-!oley, for 
instance, wrote it was Unot only incorrect but very danger­
ous to call the Hoover plan isolatlonlsm. A toreign policy 
that proposes an area of.~.Amerlcan power, from the North Sea 
to the Sea of Japan and from the North to the South Pole, 
cannot be called burying our c.ead ln the sand. u12 Warmlng 
1 
to his subj ect, l-toley we:nt on to note that Hoover had also 
/ 
I
made lt clear that the 1~.Oommun1st emplre u was .not nearly as 
secure as it appeared. In fact, it was extremely vulnerable: 
The Red China reg~me advances its borders in weak­
ness rather than in' strength. ,Its efforts to push
into southeast Asia extend its capacities to thel 	 breaking polnt. There are hundreds of thousands of 
Asiatics behind the: Red lines who can be more and
•
I 	
more activated by tbe vlrus of revolt. We mustI 	 flght with the underground ther~ as well as in the Oommunist Satellit~s ln Europe. ~:; ~ 
I 10Norman A. Grae~ner, The New Isolationism (New York: 
The Ronald Press Company, 1956), p. 21. 
11 1lAcheson: J01nt Defense, It Newsweek, January 1, 
1951, pp. '10-11. I 
12RaYmond Moley,/"The Hoover Oha1lenge, II ~., p, 60. 
I 13:rbid.
-
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Here Moley struck a ohord that was to be heard again 
and again throughout the great debate. Somehow, the notion 
that large-scale, ant i-Commun1st , olandest1ne aot1v1ties 
were occurring beh1nd the iron and bamboo ourtains became 
widely aocepted by the ,American R1ght. Yet wh'1le conserva­
It1ves placed a great amount ot ta1,th in th1s belief, they 
I' 
could never mus~er up any hard ev1denoe which m1ght support 
such' a thesis. Reterences such as Moley' s about aid1ng 
·underground" aot1v1ty were constantly being made, but most 
of them dealt With general1t1es w1th te~ specific ~ugges­
t10na as to i~plementation. Many ot the proposals were 
based more on a sense ot romant1cism than realism. Where 
'j ! they or1gin~ted.1s hardly a mystery; many ot them were 
t 's1mply based upon the propaganda ot refugee groups sueb as

, I the N~t1onal1sts on Taiwan. Chiang's government, in partia-

I \ ular, was noteworthy in its attempts to conv1nce the Un1ted 

1I States that guertlla-in1t1ated actions were occurring w1th 

i ' 

I 1noreas1ng frequency on the ma1nland. Aga1n, proof ot this 

was unobtainable, but laCk of 1t never troubled the true 

believers of Ohiang in Amer1ca. 

Zero1ng 1n on Acheson 
As they sought to detend Hoover and his fore1gn policy 
propos~lS. ~any conservat1ves sear~hed tor a ~eak l1nk 1n 
the Adm1nistrat1on f s armor. .In 'Secretary ot State Dean 
Aobeson they fel~ they found 1t, and by Deeember ot 1950 the 
· 
·, 
I 
,i 
t 
I· 
i 
. I 
is 
Secretar,y was being subjected to increas1ngly v1rulent 
attacks from the Rignt. I As dis1l1usionment with foreign 
polley lncreased, even more.moderate conservatlves began to 
vlew hlm as the prime'v11la1n in the Truman Adminlstrat1on. 
f 
Be became the soapegoat tor Admin istratlon or1t1cs because 
as one observer not,ed, "he Was the easiest target in sight. H :::. 
Aside trom p6lioy dec1sions alone, his ver,y charaoter seemed 
reason enough to ~norease the invective. Ooncern1ng this 
onslaught, one historian has noted: "His personal1ty, his 
genteel New England background, his faultless groom1ng (one 
Oongressman habitually referred to him as 'that goddamn 
tloorwalker'), h1s air ot aristocrat1c detachment, and hls 
intelleotual superiority made h1m superbly vulnerable. Hl4 In 
other words, not only Was Acheson a weak and reckless l1b­
eral, to many he was also a stuck-up snob. A more "ant1­
Amerio~1I oar1oature would be ditflcult to imagine. In 
taot, therel, seems litt le doubt that in the eyes ot his 
domest10 enemies, Aoheson assumed the proportions of an 
Amerlcan Ohamberla1n. Similarly, he would be aocused ot 
I leading Amer1can diplomacy through one Mun10h atter another. 
I And, 11ke Ohamberla~n, he would be denounced tor practic1ng
I 
I "appeasement.U 
I In a very real sense the semantics ot these attaoks
1 
l 
l 
beoame more important than the attacks themselves. "Appease­
I 
~ 
ment" emerged as the best examp;Le; it seemed the only lesson 
t 
t l4Graebner,· p. 65. 
I 
I 
, 
I 
'­(' 
19 
,the American Right 1 earned trom World War II was the use or 
this term. ,Nevertheless, trom lts use the Right Was able to 
squeeze an enormous amount 01" political mlleage. When 
employed in oonjunotion with an attac~ on Acheson. it was, 
effeotive in oonjur1ng up the lmage 01" a dapper and debonair 
dlplomat bowlng and soraping betore a leerlng Communist 
bully. Consequently', many ,,Americans were conditioned into 
assumlng that China was "lost" ln 1949 beoause o't "appease­
ment l and the rest 01" ASia would go the same way unless the 
spineless Acheson were removed trom ottlce. Even Hoover 1n 
h1s speeoh managed to matter-ot-taotly insert lt, oautlon­
lng, "We should have none 01" ~ppeasement.n HAppeaseme~t.· 
"then, became an oyerworked but lncredibly potent politioal 
shibboleth tor arous1ng 1ndignat10n at Admlnlstratlon policy 
under Acheson's oontrol. 
The attacks agalnst him acoelerated at such a clip 
that the Presldent was torced vlgorously to defend his Sec­
retary at a press conterence ln Deoember: 
These reoent attacks on Mr. Acheson are old, ln the 
sense that they are the same talse oharges--and I 
emphasize that talse oharges--that have been made 
time and again over a perlod 01" months. They have 
no bas1s in tact whatever. 
It l's the same thlng that happened to Seward. Pres­
ldent Llnooln was asked by a group 01" Republloans to 
dismlss Secretary 01" State Seward. He reiPsed. So 
do I retuse to dlsmlss Seoretary Acheson. ~ 
15u. 5., Presldent, "The Presldent I s News Oonterenoe, 
01" Deoember 19, 1950," .Pub110 Pa12srs of The Presldents of 
the United States: HarrfS. Truman (Wash1ngton: U. s. 
GOvernment Printing atfioe, 1965), p. 751. 
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! . While h1s allusion to Lincoln was overdrawn, Truman I s 
. , 
trust ln the ablllty of his Seoretary ot State was unshak­
able. He knew Aoheson to be both loyal and hard worklng. 
Moreover, he felt that even wlth ACheson gone the debate 
would oont1nue. In Truman's vlew the oonservatives .wantsd 
Aoheson's scalp beoause he stood tor !l pOlicy.M16 Much 01' 
this Hsoalp bunting" frankly perplexed the President, and be 
was later to wonder'what had happened to the })~l.partlsanshlp 
approaoh to foreign policy that had prevalled When Arthur 
I 
, Vandenberg had spoken for the Republloan .~arty. Slnce Van­
denberg's death, Truman found it dlstresslng to note ln thei -~ 
I 
Republloan party nthe rlse of a faotlon • • • that seemed to 
know no approach to government ~xoept to belittle, to de­
nounoe, and to negate. 117 

I 
{. 
i IiI 
"The ~enator From Formosaft 
Iii 
The voloe 01' Republican Senator Wllllam F. Knowland '01' 
, I i Oalifornia was to emerge as one 01' the most vocal and persis­ I 
t ten~ ln deploring and denounclng the. foreign policy or the
I Truman Administration. ~nowland gradually beol;UIle the 

II t 
I . 
. ~ unofficial prol~outor tor the Republioan Party on the sub­

I Jeot ot Far Eastern atfairs, and next to Senators Tart and 

Whe~y, he probably headed the llst o~ Truman's "lrrespons1ble 

l~arry S. Truman, Memoirs (Garden 01ty: Doubleday &:: 
Oompany, Ina., 1956), II, 430. 
17Ibld.
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t 
raotlon." Whlle most ot hls senatorlal oolleagues devoted a 
, 
good portlon ot their'etforts to disousslng the questlon ot 
European detense, Know~and llmlted most ot h1s to Asla. In 
the Senator's mind, Asia was oertainly no mere backwater; 
.. 
1ndeed, he often proolaimed that the tuture ot Europe was 
\ 
I' 	 olearly dependent on the co~se ot events 1n the Far East. 
I 
\ 	 Be was tond ot quoting what he termed Len1n's Dsound obser­t 
vatlrm" 'that lithe road to Parls 1s through Pelplng. ulSt 
Taotically, Knowland has to- be given oredlt tor his 
remarkable ab11lty to exploit the semant10s of the Cold War • 
. 
In regard to lIappeasemen~-fn tor lnstanoe, he never tlred ot 
" 
t 
; I 	 us1ng what had to be the best one-11ner on the entlre sub­

Jeot, one that he was to e~ploy on numerous occaslons: "A 

• 
I vast maJorlty ot them [Aslans) are oonv1nced, I belleve, 

J ~hat the road to appeasement 1s not the road to peace and 

i that appeasement, as at Mun1ch, 1s but surrender on the 

t 
lnstallment plan. 1t19 Thus ln one tell swoop he managed to 
1 rattle an already frightened Amer1can,pub110 by conJurlng up! b1tter memories ot H1tler, Chamberlaln, World War II, and 

t installment buylng--a memorable teat eventtor a polltlcian.
! On another ocoaslon he lnslsted that whlle Aslans stlll! 

I 
admired what the United States represented, suCh good will 

lau. s., Consress1onal Record, S2d Conga, 1st Sess., 
1951, XCVII, Part 1,,157. 
19Wil11am F. Knowland, IIA Fatetul Hour: Necesslty tor 
Combatlng Aggresslve Oommun1sm in As1a," Vltal BEeeohes, 
Deoember 15, 1950, p. 155­
I 
I 
I 
22 j 
oould be inoreased it only America would udraw the line' 
aga1nst Oommun1sm. 20 IIDraw1ng the line" had beoome an 
1mportant and catohy phrase in the Knowland lexicon. The 
> 
1dea seemed to be that tr1o~ toreign policy disputes oould 
be settled by line-drawing, muon as a schoolboy m1ght etch 
out a line with h1s toe 1n the dust ot a playground and dare 
the looal bully to step across it. However quest10nable the 
va11d1ty of such an analogy may have been, Xnowland sensed 
the American pub110 aooepted it, and that was all that 
I mattered.I 
I 
I In his speech to the Senate ot Deoember 4, he outlined 
~ policy that it 1mplemented would presumably have held the 
11ne against Commun1sm in As1a. F1rst, as the result ot aI reoent junket to Xorea, he urged that Ame%! oan airorart be 
allowed to pursue Chinese f1ghters aoross the Yalu R1ver and 
into Manchur1a. Xnowland Was yet another ot the air and\ 
t 	 naval strategists tpat the Amerioan R1ght produced in no 
i•i 	 short supply dur1ng this period. As a oonsequenoe, they 

argued that it only ~he "ott limits· s1gns were removed, 

Amerioan air power would end the war 1n Xorea. 21
i 
! Xnowland next turned h1s attention to Japan and called 
I i tor "an early Japanese peaoe treaty, ,w1th Japan hav1ng means. 
II under proper supervis1on, ot part10ipating in the oolleot1ve "II seour1ty system aga1nst aggress1on••' • ,. ,22 Most 
1 

20u. S.,Con~essional Reoord,.p. 15S. 

21Xnowland, p. 156. 22Ib1d. 
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, 
conservat1ves wholeheartedly concurred on this poin~, sens­
ing, perhaps betore most liberals, that Japan would consti­
tute an important anchor in any defensive screen in East 
Asia. (Otten, however, the impo~tanoe ot this view Was lost 
amidst the metaphorioal oliohes ot a cold War opportunist a8 
when Senator Joseph McOarthy prophes1ed: HIt Japan tal18, 
the entire Paoific talls, and we w111 have a Red Pacltic 
washlng our western shores With lts communlstio athelstio 
, 
eroslon. II ) 23 
Knowland then turned to hls favor1te topio: eoonomio 
and ml1ltary aid to Chlang Kal-shek l s reglme on Formosa. He 
~lB1med Chlang
' 
s armed forcss were over slx hundred thousand 
men strong, a torce larger "than all th~ other non-Communlst 
nat10ns ot Asla put together. n24 Such a torce was slmply 
lndispensable to the free world. It would aot as a powertul 
deterrent against any tuture Oh1nese Communist aggress1on. 
Moreover, lt supplled W1ththe proper equlpment the Republlc 
ot Chlna would be able to st1mulat a 1 t s IJnon-Oommuni at, 
guerrl11a forces ot over 1,000,000 menu which were operating 
behlnd the iron curtaln. 25 Furthe~, Chlnese Natlonal1st 
torces'(llou1d be able to oonduot "ralds tl along the coast ot 
Chlna which would have the etfeot of forclng the Commun1sts 
to slphon troops away trom M~nohuria and Koraa, thereby 
rellevlng the beleaguered Unit ad ~atlons forces t1ghtlng on 
23u• S., Congre!!,!onal R!!£2rd, Part 2, p. 2396. 
2~bld. 25~. 
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24 
the peninsula. 
Another aspect ot Knowland1s drawing-the-line plan 
oonsisted ot giving lithe Chinese Communists 4g hours to stop 
their aggress10n in Korea and to get baak across the Yalu 
River.". It they retused Knowland would have had the Unlted 
States ask all member states ot the Un1ted Nations to 
·pledgeH to withdraw any recognition that had been afforded 
that reglme. Such action. Xnowland maintained J would 
uweaken the prestige ot Mao tse-tung at home and (wOUld] 
'make that government l~legal ln, the eyes ot the people.ft26 
! ,Wh1le he dld not speo1f1c~ly say so, it seems apparent that 
/ 
Knowland telt suoh aot1on would have amounted to a diplo­1 
1 
matl0 oatastrophe ot such a magnitude that the Communist1 
government would have toppled trom sheer despair.I Flnally, Kno~land advooated Ian lmmediate naval blook­~ 
I 
; 
I a~e of the entire Oh1na coast ••• "-whloh would "not permitf 
I { the entry or exit of a vessel ot any natlonality.l2fI . 
Strangely, muoh of the Senatorls thlnklng--and this~ If. 
I I was true of many other oonservatlves as well--seemed to 
, f 
refleot a fantast10 ignoranoe and/or deliberate mlsreading 
ot what had been oocurrlng in China for the prevlous twenty 
years,. The :fanatioal fal th he held 1n Chiang and. his Kuo­I t 
mlntang,1s almost myst1fying. The only explanation that can11 
. I aooount for \such devotion was that Knowland could not bring 
, 
~ h1mself to accept the failure ot,the Nationalists. In going 
26Ibid • 
i
•I 
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25 
to almost any length to buttress t~e Ch1ang reg1me, he was 
reduced to advooating a policy whose incept10n woul~ have 
proven fatal not only to Ohlang but quiteposslbly to the 
Un1ted States ltself. Thls, at least, was the way ,the 
Truman Adm1nlstration v1ewed proposals or th1s sort. There 
lsabaolutely no ev1dence to lndloate, tor example, that a 
series of "ralds" along the coa~t ot 'Ohina would have had 
any marked etfect on the Korean confllot. The claim that 
there were one mil110n dedloated guerrlllas operatlng on the 
Mainland was probably pure tabrloat1on,?g but lt was impor­
,tent because by l~s very _~uggestlon a romantl~ lmage ot a 
oourageous but vastly outnumbered group ot treedom t1 ghters 
was 1nstllled in the m1nd of the publio. The notion that 
Mao would have withdrawn trom Korea as ,the result ot a 
torty-eight hour ultlmatum, lest he lose "prestlge," was 
ludicrous.' Again, it lndloated that Knowland had riot the 
vaguest ldea ot,what Mao and bis revolutlon were all about. 
And the proposal that a blockade ot China I s coast wlth the 
rlght to turn baok vessels 'at "any- nat1onallty" amounted to 
a declaration of war against Chlna anQ qu1te posslbly 
aga1nst any other natlon whlch mlght choose to challenge 
such a ukase. 'Clearly, in Deoember or 1950 the Unlted 
States dld not lntend to prooeed along suan a path. 
2SWhen querled about this"statistl0 by the author, 

Senator Knowland chose not t'o reply. 
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Wh~le Knowlandrs J1ngo1sm was sucoessful 1n ga1n1ng 
h1m further publ101ty and 1n extend1ng -the attaok on the 
Admin1strat1on, 1t also had the ettect ot myst1fy1ng some ot 
h1D oonAtorlAl oollnA~\~Q. To aom~, no mAttAr how th~ npn~ 
ator sought to disgu1se oertain unpleasant eventua11t1es, 
his remarks seemed to otter the very real possib111ty ot an 
all-out war w1th Oommun1st Oh1na. Such think1ng naturally 
led them to wonder 1t th1s would mean a land war-on the 
/ 
As1an oont1nent. As a result of such disqu1et1ng thoughts, 
Knowland hastened to a,ssure h1s tellow senators that noth1ng 
oould have been turther trom h1s own mind: 
I have never tavored sending a Un1ted Nat10ns land 
army 1nto Manchur1a o~ 1nto China. I have never 
. tavored sending an Amerloan ~my 1nto Manchur1a or 
lnto Oh1na. I th1nk that would be a tut1le polley.
It would be the same m1stake that Napoleon made 1n 
Russ1a, and that others have made in the lnvas10n 
ot Russla. I would not operate 1n an area ot ter­
ra1n 1n whloh the enemy ls super10r to us by 10 to 
1. I would ,operate 1n areas where we!Are2~uperlor 
to them by many times that number to one. ';J , 
; , 
t 	 The quest10n remalned, however, Just prec1sely what wereI 
those areas where the Un1ted States was "superior to them by
t 
many t1mes that number to oneil? To Knowland the anawer was 
I. 	 slmple: '1n sea and air power. Amerlcan sea and all' power, 
ooupled w1th \Ohlang 1 s Amer1can-equlpped armles, would be 
capable ot dea11ng the Commun1sts a blow trom which they 
would never recover. Stll1, Skeptlos tound 1t dlfflcult to 
1maglne, g1ven the ~stOr.1 ot Chlang's m111tary record ln 
29u. S., Q£a~ess10nal Record, p. 162. 
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China, that Nationalist armies' could ever wrestle back con-
trol of the Mainland, even with the added faotor ot Amer10an 
sea and a1r power~ Knowlan~'s oontention was eventually to 
" beoome one or the weakest weapons 1n the arsenal ot the 
R1ght. ' 
As mentioned above, becau·se ot h1s fasoination w1th 
As1a Knowland tound little time to devote to Europe. Even 
during the height ot the debate he could only bring h1mself 
to propose hslt-heartedly that Amerioa allocate one d1v1sion 
tor European duty 'tor every six d1visions tielded by the 
Europeans themselves. 30 __ The proposal'go't nowhere, and 
,Knowland seemed, not t'o oare, a refleotion, no doubt, ot his 
general lack ot interest in the ent1re European issue. It 
the subjeot ot Europe did oooasionally str1ke a spark of 
1nterest 1n him, it Was over a related matter rather than 
Europe itself. In m~ng h1s proposal on a ratio ot Ameri-
oan divis10ns for NATO, for example, he saw the 1mportanoe 
of Europe linked, of' all places, to Afrioa: "Oertainly it 
1s vital that Europe not tall 1nto the orbit ot 1nter-
national oommun1sm. It, Europe 1:8 lost to the tree world, 
the strateg1c bases, and materials of Atrioa would be d1ffi-
oult to hold. The bulk of the uranium tor the American 
atomio development oomes trom Africa."3l It is ot interest 
to note that wh1le t.he Senator found the uranium ore ot 
Afr10a to be 9.~ pr1me importance to the.Un1ted States, he 
could n,ot b:rlng. that same th1nk1n.g to bear 1n regard to theI , 28 
coal. iron ~:reJ and industrial capabi11ty of Western Europe. 
Western Europe was important because it :represented a step­
pingstone to Africa, not because of any worth ot its own. 
Becau.se of this factor XnoWland felt Europe would have to be 
defended, but hopefully not with American ground pe:rsonnel 
in large numbe:rs. Exactly how Europe should be detended 
Xnowland did not spell out. Apparently satisfied that he 
had done his duty in explaining how the tide ot Oommun1sm 
could be reversed in the F8l' East, he lett this oho:rs to his 
close friend, Robe:rt A.___Tatt •. 
Robert A. Tatt: "Mr. Amer1ca~ 
Herbert Hoover had beoome the eld~r statesman ot the 
new isolationist movement, William Knowland had beoome its 
As1an authority, but the maestro or the ent1re eftort was 
Republican Senator Robert A. Tatt o~ Ohio. By 1950 Tatt had 
arrived at an extremely important post for a Repub11can in 
the Senate: he was chairman of the Senate ~epubl1can Po11cy 
Oommittee, having risen to th1s position through the ranks 
ot the Republican Party w$h remarkable sw1ttness. What ever 
the attributes are that propel a man up the ladder ot Amer1­
can polit.ical su.ooess, Tatt seemed to possess them. During 
the 194o ' s he beoame established as ~ Republican voice 1n 
,the Senate on domest10 attaira. Atter World War II he also 
sougot to become an expert on toreign affairs. .He gradually 
J 

I 
· 
1 	 sllpped 1nto thls role and assumed lt completely w1th the 
death ot Arth,ur Vandenburg ln 1950. It was not long betore 
he somenow began to personlfy what proper oonservatlve 
th1nklng ougot to be all about, and beoause ot thls abll1ty 
he was nlcknamed HMr. Republloan.· One histor1an has sug­
gested, however, that by the time ot the great debate he had 
become uMr. Amerlca, If so we+ l dld he express II the publlc I s 
amblvalent lsolatlon1st-aggresslve state ot emotlon" on 
world atfa1rs.)2 An exam1nat~on lnto Tattls ph1losophles 
does muoh to oonflrm the approprlateness ot the uMr. Amer­
10a" eplthet, and lt also alds ln explainlng how the Senat~ 
beoame the acknowledged leader of the "new ls01atlonlsts. 1 
Flrst and fundamentally, Taft had always been a vlgor~ 
ous and slncere antl-00mmunlst. He could toresee no worse 
evl1. Throughout hls senatorlal ca~eer he tougot Oommunlsm 
lnternally and externally. And as otten 8eems to be the 
oase wlth oonservatives, Tart reoognized the danger ot Com­
munlsm but Was apparently lnoapable ot seelng any threat 
which mlght ohallenge the Republl0 trom the other end ot the 
politloal speotrum. William S. White, a generally fr1endly 
b10grapher ot Tart t s, has revealed: 
In the war years and later h~ r1diouled any 'theory
that Nazl Germany had ever raised any danger to the 
United states. He sald to me as late as November ot 
1951 that at no time had Germany menaoed the securlty 
ot the Unlted States and that there would have besn 
, 
32John w. Spanler, The Truman-MacArthur Controversl 
;/ and the Korean War (Oambr1dge: Belknap Fress, 1959), p. 156. 
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no menace even had the Brltlsh fallen. . . .. 33 
H1s passlonate denouncements at Communlsm were dl­
reoted pr1mar~11 agalnst the Sovlet Unlon whlch he saw as 
the prlme mover ot all Oommunist activlty everywher~. 
"Soviet Rus~la,n as Tart preferred to call lt, had broken 
every treaty to whlch lt had ever been a slgnatory. It had 
promoted the'ml1ltar1 aotlons of both North Korea and Ch1na. 
There 11a8 '''sufflolent evldence, II he warned ln a speech on 
the 5en~te 
\ 
floor, "of' a determined plan to oommunlze the 
entlre world, wh1ch oan be olearly envlsloned from the wrlt­
lngs 01' Lenln and 8tallij~ just as Hltler's lntentlon oould 
be round ln ~ein KSllll~f."34 In the Senator's mlnd, proof of' 
the exlstenoe ot such a "plano could be tound by taklng note 
of how far the oonsplracy had progressed wi thin the Unlted 
States lt selt. He inslsted various, organlzations and labor 
unlons were belng 1nr11trated, as was "the government it­
selt .1135 He had no apparent dlfflculty ln relatlng the 
maoh1natlons of Sov1et imperla11sm wlth domestlc 1ssues 
lnslde the United States and even, by lmpllcatlon, With an 
Amerlcan government oontrolled by a party of whlch he was 
not a member. Sly allegatlons ot this sort always boosted 
hls stook With tellow Republloans but over a perlod of tlme 
oaused moderates to wonder about the credlblllty or his 
33W1l11am S. White, The Tatt Storl (New York: Harper 
&Brothers, 1954), p. 151. 
340 .. 8., Oongresslonal Reoord, p. 56. 35~. 
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arguments 1n matters dealing With foreign affa1rs. It grad-
ually became evident that hi.s own style may have been one ot 
the oh1ef obstacles in his legislat1ve dereats~ 
W1th Tattls concern over the oonSpiratorial power ot 
J the Sov1et Un10n being what it was, 1 t would. seem probable 
that he would have been 1n the forefront of the tight to 
fnorease the strength of NATO foroes in We~tem Europe. But, 
strangely, suCh w~s not the oase. He aot1~ely opposed 
Amerioan part1oipation in any European defense program 
except under oertain speoified conditions. The bas1s for 
his opposition was man1~_old"-and often oddly contrad1otory, 
at least when oompared With his ideas on the defense problems 
ot the Far East. 
Although the Soviets may have been engaging in var10us 
sin1ster actiVities, Taft s1noerely felt that th~y were not 
1nterested in launching any massive invas10n 1nto Western 
Europe. In fact, he felt American reaction to t~e possib1l-
ity of suoh an attack m1g~t well cause the Sov1ets to 1n1--
t1ate 1t out ot selt-detense: 
The oourse we are pursuing Will make War more 
likely. It this great international force whioh 
we env1sion 1s gradually built up, the Rues1ans 
tor a while Will gradu~lly increase the1r strength, 
'but 1t seems obvious that it they think the Al11es 
are g~1n1ng on them too rap1dly', they can always 
begin the war. However defensive and pac1fic our 
intentions, to them the building up o~ this torQg 
must lO'ok like aggression when 1t 1s completed.' 
Tart went' o~ to note that he had been unable to d1scover any 
;6Ibld., p. 60. 
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evidence which indicated the Soviets were p~eparlng to 
lnvade Western Europe. Further, he wondered, tor what were 
they waltlng? Surely lt made better sense tor them to 
strike when ,western defenslve pos1t1ons were weak rather 
than walt tor the completion 01' an Amerlcan and allled bulld 
. . 
up. All of thls wa~ reason enough, he clalmed, to be 
against any inoreased Amerlcan role ln NATO, just as he bad 
been opposed to the very formatlon of the Atlantl0 Paot in 
1945. Apparently acoepting any support he oould find tor 
hls argument ,he was not above polntlng out the Atlant 10 
Alliance "abandoned the whole prlnclple of the United 
Nations,"37\Wh1ah was a rather ourlous statement ,for Tart 
slnce he had shown little lnclinatlon to defend U. N. 
prlnclpl$s in the 'past. 
Often, however, it dld appear Tart was unsure of h1s 
own.posit10n. From time to time he noted, albe1t hesl­
tantly, that lf Western Europe fell to the Sovlets the 
threat to Amer1can liberty would be oonslderable. Stl1l, he 
oautloned, it dld not follow Jlthat beoause we des1re the 
freedom of every oountry ln the world we must send an 
Amerloan land army to that country' to defend it."3g After 
all, Europe had more than a sufflo1ent manpower base fro~ 
whloh to raise an adequate army to repel any Sov1et attaok. 
37Robert A. Taft, IIgnlted States Relat10ns With West­
erll Europe," V1tal SEeeohes, Jum 15,1951, p. 51g. 
3gu. S., Oongresslonal Reoord, p. 1120. 
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America need only supply the armament. No Amerioan divisions 
would be necessary. ·It the situation became really desper­
ate ~ however t he Was wil11ng to employ Amerioan air and sea 
unlts. 
Taft seemed to base at least part of his milltary 
th1nking on his own reading of the outoome ot World War II. 
In hls mlnd two sim~le lessons had emerged trom the War. 
First, the Russlans had created a tremendous land army that 
Was almost unstoppable; and sec~nd, the Amerioans had put 
together an alr force which proved to be, ln hls own words, 
lithe declslve factor ln the 'Winnlng of the war."39 Given 
these two axioms, Taft consldered lt merely common sense to 
mlnlmlze the role of American ground forces and to maximlze 
Amerlc~ alr power. Further, since the U. S. Navy was v1c-" 
torlous ln the Pacltlc, its role ln any coming detensive 
strategy would also have to be emphaslzed. 
In short, 1n a Milltary sense Taft nurtured a. strategy 
that suggested a phllosophical cross between Alfred T;. Mahan 
and Curt1s LeMay. That suCh a oomblnatlon would be etfeo­
tlve was never doubted by the Senator: 
.My own Vlei<1 ls that we do have the capaclty to 
seoure a practlcal control .of sea and alr, through­
out the world. I believe we do have the capaclty 
to bul1d up an alr force so superlor to Russla as 

to glve us control ot the alr over thls country, 

over the oceans that" surround thls continent and 

everywhere, except perhaps over Russia itself. I 

believe that should be the first prlority, and I 

have not heard any substantlal objection made 

39Ibld., p. 57. 
I 
aga1nst this priority. In theory the adm1n1strat1on 
agrees.40In pract1ce they seem to prefer land 
arm1es. 
What accounted for Tattls 1nfatuat1on With a1r and 
naval. 	power' Poss1bly the best an'swer is supplied by 
White: 
He told me 1n 1951, 1n the per10d when he was 
f1rst clamor1ng for a reassessment of fore1gn-m111ta~
polley to g1ve pract1cally all the emphasls to sea­
alr, that h1s .proposal had been 1nfluenoed, it not 
shaped, by' "oerta1n read1ng" he had been d01ng. "What 
read1ng, Senator," he was asked. "I have gone very 
carefully aga1n over the h1story of the Napoleon1c
campa1gn, II he replled. "Wel11ngton at Waterloo 
acoomp11shed what he ~ld w1th only twenty per cent 
of h1s troops trom th. Un1ted Kingdom and the rest 
mercenar1es." I 
He had, 1n short, bf a strange paradox" a com­
pulslve blas toward the most trad1tlonally profes­
sional of all profess10nal ml1itary op1nion. He 
bel1eved that what Br1taln had done ln the 
e1ghteenth oentury by her control of the sea the 
.Un1ted States and Br1ta1n. w1th Br1ta1n of oourse 
the lesser partner i could do past the halfway mark 
1n the twent1eth century.
In thls regard he saw a1r power as only an exten­
s10n ot the' sea arm. And because of hls hes1tat1ons,
because of his l1vely but uncomprehending compass10n 
tor the nasty job of the 1nfantry, he gladly ac­
oepted one of the speclal prejud10es of the ol~~ 
taSh10ned Admirals--the1r preJud1ce agalnst a war 
ot mass and espeolally aga1nst hav1ng to use vast 
'numbers ot amateurs 1n the shape of qu10kly lm­
pressed c1vll1ans. Taft could readily understand 
th1s; he d1d,not 11ke amateurs 1n po11tl~al ' c~mpa1gns .11-1 
As wlth Hoover, Tatt also tearea the posslble eoonom1c 
repercusslons .of a thlrd world,war. War would have meant 
4oTatt , "Un1ted States Relatlons w1th Western Europe,· 
p. 	511. 
41Wh1te,·p.154. 
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probable rederal controls on the rree enterprise system, a 
disaster in Tattls opinion. White quotes him as saying 
that any future war might torce lithe nationalization of all 
industry and all capi~al and ~ll labor" whioh could onlr 
mean an eventual "socialist diotatorship. n42 Even the 
/ 
preparation ror War "was likely to be almost 8s':Jbad as war 
itselt. u43 (Taft's .anxiety in this area was Shared by h1s 
colleague, Kenneth Wherry, Who in addressing the Senate 
onoe wondered rhetorically, "How long ••• do you suppose 
America can, escape becoming a garrison state when annual 
expenditures are running at the rate ot a hundred billion 
dollars'") 44 Su~h a Vi;; may sound strange in the light ot 
hiD dedicat10n to a strong air and naval torce, but Taft 
actually felt that air and naval readiness would not be 
nearly as eXpensive as the maintenance of hundreds ot 
1nt~try divisions. 45 
T~tt also ins1ste~ that much at h1s opposition to 
Truman's de~ire to increase Amerioan ground forces was based 
on the manner in which the inorease was to be oarried out. 
Re ttalt ,that Truman had to seoure the approval ot Congress 
before prooeeding W1th any increase; to do ot~erw1Be would 
be tantamount to subverting the Constitution. Taft referred 
42~., p. 150. 43lliSi., p. 153. 
440. S., Con~essiona!-~~~, p. 32g. 

45Wh1te, p. 153. In 1950-51 this may well have been 

the oase, although it is almost imposs1ble to arrive at any 
oost c;somparison. 
• • • 
to this upon oooaslon as the IIfundamental lssue" 1n the 
great debate and attacked execut1ve agreements 1n fore1gn 
polloy beoause they threatened the llbertles of the Amer1can ' 
people. 46 Whether 1t really was the "fundamental lssue" ls 
open to aer1ouaquestlon; what mattered, however, was that 
J 	 • 
tact10ally Tart was able to hurt the Adm1nlstrat10n moro 
wlth th1s one Charge than wlth other weapon in hls armory_ 
'The ldea ot presldential usurpat10n of congressional power 
dld not sit well With his tellow senators, and Tart knew it. 
Even tormer Secretary ot State James Byrnes was forced to 
agree, argulng, nIr ~e are to have a bl-partlsan polley, the 
President should consult the leaders ot the mlnorlty 
party betore and not atter baslc deois10ns ot po11cy are 
made. Once deo1s10ns are 'made, consultatlon is a sham.- 47 
Flnally, tor all hls worr,ylng about Amerlca becom1ng 
overextended in Europe, Tatt was shoulder to shoulder with 
Knowland on IIhold1ng the l1ne ll ln As1a. He became part at 
what White has aptlY oalled "the polltloo-m1l1tary cult that 
. If.g
developed around General MaoArthur. a As1de trom bestow1ng 
hosannas on MacArthur and h1s policies, the oult encouraged 
,
"I 	
a strong sense of American nat1o~11sm, qUest10ned the 
patr10tism and motives of oertain Admin1stration offiolals, 
4,6U• S., Q,£ngref!sional Re£g£,~, P'. 61. 
47James F. Byrnes, flF1rm Stand by a Un1ted People May 
Prevent War," V1tal Speeches, February 15, 1951, p .. 269. 
4-gWh1 t e , p. 16,7. 
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and, ae has been shown, denied the notion of European • 
defense being related to Amer1can seourity. Tart, White 
maintains, n' • • • was riot wholly oomfortable 1n the cult 
aspect ot the thing. n49 Perpaps not, but somehow he man­
aged to h1de his discomtort. 
--~-
"'J 
49Ibid .,. p. l6S. 
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CHAPTER III 
• 
THE ADMINISTRATION'S CASE 
Muoh of the Adm1n1strat10n's fear of the poss1b1lity 
the Sov1ets would attack Western Europe was generated by the 
~enera~ Oold War atmosphere Wh1ch grew not1oeably more 
fr1g1d after 194a. Most author1t1es have f1xed tl'lO events 
1n part1oular--the detonat10n ot the f1rst SoViet atom1c 
bomb late 1n 1949 and the Oommun1st attack on South Korea 
1n June of 1950--a8 the prime causes of th1s apprehens10n. 
Indeed, after the open1ng of the Korean War h1gh off1c1als, 
both 1n Wash1ngton and 1n the caplt~ls,ot Western Europe 
"seemed to be agreed that the Sov1ets'had sh1fted baok from 
po11t1cal means for ach1ev1ng the1r amb1t10ns to m111tary 
ones." l The 1mpetus for'proViding additional Amer1can 
troops to NATO would therefore seem to date from th1s per10d. 
Aotually, however, Admin1strat10n aot10n 1n this 
regard "began apprOximately s1x months ear11er. On January 
p30, 1950 th ~~a1dent author1zed the Nat10nal Seour1ty 
Oouno1l to begin work on a seoret study (NSO-6g) wh1ch would 
analyze the objeot1ves ot the Dn1,ted States 1n peaoe and war 
dur1ng the oom1ng years. The study was oompleted 1n the 
, 
" 
'1 
II 
IIlaoger H11eman, "NATO: The Developing Strategi.c Oon­
II 
I 
text,Q NATO and Ame~1can Secur1tl; ed. K1uss Knorr (Pr1nce­
ton: Prinoeton UnlverS!ty Prees; 1959), p. 19. 
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spr1ng ot the same year and was to prove to be a m1lestone 
or sorts 1n the shap1ng of Amer10an fore1gn pol1cy. Wh1le 
'it has not yet been declassified, the general reoommenda­
tion of NSO-6g are fairly well known. It oonoluded that 
Soviet policy oonsisted ot three major objectives Which have 
been summarized as: 
(1) to preserve and to~strengthen its pos1tion as 
the ideological and power center 01' the Communist 
l1orld;( 2) to extend and to consol1date that power
by acquis1t10n 01' new satellites; and (3) to oppose
and to weaken any oompeting system if power that 
~hreatens Oommunist world hegemony. 
In light 01' these oonolusions, it seemed sate to predict 
that Soviet military strength would oontinue to increase 
over that 01' the West until "the eoonom1c rehab111tation ot 
. Western Europe and the full implementat10n 01' the NATO al11­
anoel. were oarr1ed out.3 
The forecasts related 1n NSO-6s were not unanimously 
acoepted by all b~anohes 01' the Admin1~trat10n, however. 
l State Department offi01als were Sharply div1~ed over it. 
The so-oalled "Krem11nologists" at State argued Mosoow had 
no real desire'to assume the role of an.expans10n1st m111­
tary power bent on world dom1nat10n. Members of the Plan­
ning 'Statt,. inolud1ng Dean Aoheson himselt, argued that 
while th1s was tine in theory, it must not detraot trom the 
2Cabell Ph1ll1ps, The Truman Pres1dencl (New York: 

The Macm1l1an Company, 1966J, p. 306, 01t1ng Paul Y. Ham­

mond, Nso-6S: pr()lO~e to Rearmament (New York: Columb1a 

Un1versitrPr~ss, 3:-9 }, no p •.. no. g1ven. 

3J:'bid.» p.307. 
1 lli.d. f n 
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fact that the Soviets would oontinue to probe tor "weak 
spots". in the West and, onoe having found suoh trailties, 
would demand oonoesslons.4 It was neoessary, theretore, to 
el1minate the vulnerab1l1ty of suen areas by inoreasing the 
strength ot military allianoe systems suah as NATO. Natu­
rally, the v1ew of the Aoheson team prevailed. 
Still, how valid were th~ views and reoommendations ot 
NSC-6g? Senator Taft, who knew nothing about the study, 
I 
would surely have rejected it out of hand as a ·clumsy 
attempt to bolster ,the sagging NATO allianoe. Moreover, 
trom the evidenpe so far aVailable it would seem probable 
that even those who were the most impressed with it were not ~ 
totally assured of its validity. Under the oircumstanoes 
possibly the bes~ defense of the report was penned by Dean 
Acheson almost twenty years later: 
A decade and a half later a school of academio 

critic~sm has concluded that we overreacted to 

Stalin, which in turn caused him to overreact to 

polioies of the United States'. This may be true. 
FortunatelY1 perhaps, these authors were not oalled 
upon to an~yze a situation in whioh the United ~tates had not taken the aotion whioh it did take. 5 
~at ever the validity of th,e premises or the report, 
onoe they were aooepted they had to be sold to the Congress
\ 
and the ·pub110. This was preoisely what Aoheson did in the 
.late spring and early summer ot 1950. Unfortunately, as he 
4nean AOheson, ~resent at the Creation (New York: 
W. W. Norton & Company, 1969), p. 753•. 
5Ibid.
-
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was later to adm1t, an "over-sell" was deemed neoessary; 
consequentiy tbe nature of the Sov1et menace tell ~lctlm to 
hyperbole. Again, Aoheson hlmself explained 1t best: 
Qua11f1oat10n must g1ve way to s1mp11oity ot state­
ment, nlcety and nuanoe to bluntness, almost brutal­
1ty, 1n carrying home a polnt. It 1s better to oarry
the heare~or reader into the ~adrant ot one's 
thought ~han merely to make a noise or to mlslead hlm 
utterly. 
And, so it came to pass th~t, in the Seoretary's words, Hit 
we made our po1nts clearer than truth, we did not dltfer 
trom most other eduoators and oould hardly do otherwlse. D7 
As an "educatorP Acheson would prove to b~ no small success, ­
I even though some ot his-students turned out to be 1ncor­
r1g1ble. 

W1th the acoeptanoe ot Nso-6S 1n Adm1n1stratlon Circles 
and w1th Aoheson's "over-sell" oampalgn under way by late 
sprlng, obv1ously much of Wash1ngton's anx1ety to~ard Sovlet 
1ntent1ons 1n Europe had orystal11zed betore the start ot 
the Korean War. The' decision to augment NATO was olearly 
related d'1reotly to the tlndlnlis ot NSO-6S. 'filen the war 
1n Korea 19n1ted, 1t served only to re1nforoe a tundamental 
be11et already held by key Adm1n1strat10n personnel: the 
torces or internatlonal Commun1sm, d1reoted by the Kremlin, 
were on the march. 
6 ~., p. 375. ' 
7Ibid.
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The Detense 01' Eur0E! 
The Administration held a series 'ot high level meet­
ings during the summer months to t~rash out the exaot nature 
the detense of Europe would take. Prodded by the Pentagon, 
Aoheson and his advlsers reaohed the oonolusion that German 
participatlon would be neoessary it a suocessful detense ot 
Europe were tf be guaranteed. On the last d~y ot 'July the 
. g
Seoretary ~o~~nced the Presldent 01' this vlew. The prob­
lem, however,1 now beoame doubly diff1cult: not only would 
the American jPublio have to be'conVinced that increased par- ­
t'ic~pat1on 1J NATO was 'necessary, but it would also have to 
aocept the t~ot that a tormer hated toe would be needed ln 
. 
the alllance. This latter issue would also prove to 
' 
be a 
I 
I sore point ~th the other alliance members. ,The Admlnlstra­
tion of cour~e realized th1s, but the tear ot a Sov1et inva­
. f­
sion was so strong that German lnvolvement was consldered 
essentlal. ~ccording to Aoheson: ·At the time • • • the 
danger to Eu~ope seemed to us great and immediate" and thes~ 
dec1sions we~e not belng made 1n the unhurried oalm ot an 
I 
aoademic study.19 

These tssues and others were brought to the attent10n 

of the other alliance mem~ers during a series at meet1ngs 

r 
held in New iork beglnning on September 15- To avoid any 

unscp.eduled ~ub110 disclosure during these meetings, 

I ' 
9~., p. 440.g.~+ I p. 437. 
President Truman on September 9 first publicly announced 
America's intent to increase its torges stationed in Western 
Europe. l(hile not disolosing exaot figures, the President 
let it be known that the number of additional troops needed 
would be "worked out in olose ooordination II With other NATO 
t' 
members. 
Oonservative Opposition to the announcement and the 
NATO meeting was largely blunted by the success ot the 
Inchon invasion in ,Korea. With the recapture of SeOUl and 
the almost total annihilation of'the North Korean armies, 
protestations 1n ~egard t?-European polioy momentarily Bank 
trom sight. In fact, senatorial support tor Truman's pro­
posed troop increase seemed to mount, at least among,Admin­
istration supporters. Senator Tom Connally, ohairman ot 
the important Foreign Relations Oommittee,remarked: 
. Despi te the war in Korea and the tension thro~gh­
out the Far East--let us never forget it--Europe is 
st1ll the pivotal point. Continued weakness in 
western Europe will free the Soviet Un10n for aggres­
sive action everywhere. A strong Europe is a bar­
rier,. not only to Soviet ambitions in the west, but 
to the Kremlin's treedom of aotioDOin the Middle 
East and in the Far East as well:. J. . 
During the ne~t two months the NATO question continued 
to simmer on the back burner while the Korean s1tuation bub­
bled and eventually bo11ed over. Nevertheless, the defense 
ot Europe and the question of Amerioan participation in that 
lOU. S., Con~essional Reoord, Slst Cong., 2nd Sess., 
XCVI, Part 2, 15~52 • 
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detense oould not be forgotten. , As Acheson later put it: 
, The North Atlantio Treaty, its organization, and 
its m1litary torces are recognition ot the truth that 
no balanoe of power in Europe, or elsewhere, adequate 
to restrain Soviet pow'er is poss1ble unless the 
weight of the United States is put 1'nto the soales. 
Without assooiation with the United States, the Euro~ 
pean powers cannot prevent the le'adera ot the Soviet 
Union from having the1r way in Western Eu~ope. With­
out Amerioan association With Western Europe, 
indapendl.ent nat10nal lite in Eastern Europe oannot 
rev1ve. 1 
In order to pursue these ends, Aoheson tlaw to Brus­
sels 1n the -middl a of December. Once there he sought agree­
ment tor the appointment ot an Amerioan as Supreme Commander 
of an integrated NATO force. Atter some disoussion the 
oounoil deoided it IIwould appoint General E1senhower as 
Supreme Commander ot the integrated force and each govern­
ment would put under his oommand its troops ass1gned to the 
1ntegrated torce. ul2 Most observers felt that given E1sen­
hower's baokground in World War II, the decision was mili­
tar1ly sound. Lett unsa1d was the taot that since he was 
Amer1can, hi s appo1ntment would a1d in dampen1ng any conser­
vative opposition to the NATO issue that m1ght develop 
within the United- States. 
Ironioally, however, while ~he Secretary was adroitly 
maneuver1ng matters in Br~ssels, Herbert Hoover was busy 
delivering the open1ng oannonade of th~ g~eat debate. 
llnean ACheson, Power ,and D1plomaol (Cambridge: 
Harvard UniverSity Press, 1958), p. 84. 
l2Acheson, Present at ~he Creation, p. 4S6. 
" .11.. 1I 
I 
.
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geturn1ng to Washington on December 21, Aoheson was aghast 
when he heard abQut Hoover" s speeoh: liThe stench of spirit­
less defeat, of death ot high hopes and broad purposes, 
given ott by these statements deeply shocked me. It, took a 
•day of talk1ng with my assoclates tor the sltuatlon to sink 
In. Ill; Apparently the exact nature of the Hoover speeoh had 
caught the whole Adm1n1stratlon otf guard. On December 19, 
only two days earller, Presldent Truman had indicated 11ttle 
conoern over the strength of his domest10 opposltlon: 
Q. Mr. President, in 11ne With what you have been 
telllng us about forelgn polloy, a number of writers 
believe that there is a--as they put It--a wave ot 
1so1atlonlsm rlslng ln the Unlted States. Do you
teel that oonditlon to exlst? 
THE PRESIDENT. I donlt thlnk there 1s any Wave ot 
'ls01atlon1sm,. put Side of the Ch1oago Tr.,1bune anq
those papers.1Ll­
Owlng to the reverberatlons ot the Hoover speeoh, the 
Adm1n1strat10n began to have se~ond thoughts over the pos­
slble 1nfluenoe ot the new lso1at1onlsts. On December 22 
Aoheson oalled h1s own news oonterenoe'and sharply rebutted 
polnt by polnt Hoover's remarks. He ended by oalllng on the 
Amerloan people to reJeot "any pol~oy ot sltt1ng qulver1ng 
ln a storm oellar waltlng for whatever fate others may w1an 
13Ib1d., p. 4S9. 
14U. 5., Presldent, "The President's News Conferenoe 
ot Deoember 19, 1950, II Pub11c Papers of 19.e. President s 2! 
the Unlted States: Ha~rl S. Truman (Washlngton: Unlted 
States Government Prlntlng Off~oe, 1965), p. 752. 
" ' ' 
........- ...-=:,:" ,!;'" ::.:!. ~••~","",_H ~.......... ... .... ... ... 

n I! !n~n I I II n' n 11m I1[ 
46 
to prepare for us. n15 . As the news conference ooncluded, it 
was clear to most onlookers the Adminlstration was now tully 
oognizant or the danger pose~ to the nation's foreign po11cy 
by the Hoover~~a~t segment of the Repub11a&n Party and wae 
, 
prepared to engage 1t in verbal battle. Just three days 
before, the President had stated he could see no nwave ot 
isolation1sm" washing over the oountry. Now Acheson had 
. . 
asserted that neither. was the Administration g01ng to allow 
one to swell up. 
So matters rested tor the remain1ng two weeks ot the 
old year as both oamps broke tor the respite afforded by the 
~.-" . 
holidays. Yet 1t seemed a foregone conolusion that with the 
com1ng ot the new year the great debate was go1ng to take up 
a lot or everyone's time. 
The Conservatives Attack 
The atta'ok on the Adm1n1st;ratlon's:'forelgn polloy was 
launohed anew in a lQng speech made by Robert Tart on the 
rloor or the Senate on January 5, 1951, just three days 
berore the Pres1dent was soheduled to deliver ~s annual 
State 'ot the Un10n address. Tatt's remarks were noteworthy 
tor the1r scattergun etrect: they h1t Just about every tar-
get that had ever outraged the Amer1can Right. In some 
respects they a'leo 'oonveyed a sense ot frustrat1on, of some 
15Dean Acheson, "United Aotion tor the Defense or a 
Free World, U The De12artment ot State Bulletin, January 1, 
1951, p. 6. 
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desperate grandstand ~lay needed to gain the pub11c's atten­
tion and win its support of foreign policy issues. 
Beg1nning with-Korea, which in January or 1950 seemed 
the epitome ot hopelessness, ~att lashed out at America's 
role 1n the world. Korea afforded Taft an exoellent example 
With wh10h to attaok the Admin1strat10n because his own 
views on the Wal' were always so ambiguous. On the one hand 
he demanded a po11cy that would insure "total viotory' over 
Commun1sm 1n Asia. Yet on the other he opposed the flneed­
less slaughter ot AmerIcan boys," even 1f such opposit10n 
meant the total evacuat10n of Amer1can troops trom the area. 
Regardless ot,,;;what the A'dm1nlstrat1on did, then, the Korean 
War became a oonvenient politioal whipsaw which Taft and h1s 
tellow d1ss1dents used to bludgeon it. On occasion, as 1n 
his speech ot January 5, this s,trategy took some cur10us 
tWists. Tart proposed that the United States had been duped 
by the Sov1ets 1nto getting 1nvol.ved in the war in the first 
place. Thie they had acoomplished by slyly inveigling the 
,Adm1n1stration into initiating and helping to pass the 
Un1ted Nations resolution whioh author1zed a military re­
sponse to North Korea's aggress1on, a resolution the Soviets 
could ~ot veto because they ware boyootting the ~eourity 
Council at the t1me. However, since the Chinese entered the 
, 
war it had become.imposs1ble to pass a s1m1lar resolution 
aga1nst them because the Sov1ets were once again partici­
pating,in the Security Counoil. mo Tatt the lesson WaS 
4g 
olear: proper United Nations m1litary action aga1nst Ch1na 
(the bomb1ng 01' Chinese bases and supply lines, tor 1n­
stanoe) could not be brought to bear because ot this trick­
ery. The Soviets at first had purposely stayed away trom 
the Seour1ty Counoil meet1ngs in order to "suckA the United 
States into the war, and then they had reola1med the1r seat 
1n order to insure the Chinese an opportunity to engage 
America in an endless and apparently stalemated ground war. 
Tatt could "only sadly surmise: . "We were sucked 1nto the 
Korean War, as a representative ot the United Nations, by a 
delusion as to a power whioh never has existed under the 
Charter."16 As to the future, he would not hes1tate a guess 
but oftered the suggestion that it worst came to worst, it 
would be Utar better to tall baok to s' defensible pos1tion 
in Japan and Formosa than to maintain a Korean position 
which would surely be 1ndefens1ble in any third world 
war. ,17 
Tatt's willingness to "tall back l• to Japan and Formosa 
was aga1n 1nd1cative 01' his strong trust 1n air and sea 
power. Amerioan airoraft and naval vessels would be able to 
defend, these 1s1ands trom any foe. H1s reasoning tor so 
thinking was otten grounded, a s his b10grapher Wil11am s. 
\f.nite has already shown,. 1n quest10nable histor1cal 
16u• S., Congress1onal Reo~~, g2d Cong., 1st Sess., j , XCVII, Part 1, 57. 
17~., p. ,8. 
/ 
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analogles: 
Our posltlon ls not greatly un11ke that ot Great 
Br1taln, wh10h dom1nated muoh ot the world for a 
perlod of 200 years, and brought about the balanoe 
ot peaoe of the last halt of the n1neteenth century.
'The Brlt1sh had oontrol of the seas and met every
ohallenge to that oontrol. There Was no questlon 
Of a1r power. They seldom oomm1tted any oonslder­
able number ot Br1t1sh land troops to oontlnental 
warfare, and When they did so they were by no means 
suooesstul. 
It Was the sea power of Br1ta1n wh10h gave Br1tain 
a powertul 1nfluenoe on the Contlnen~ of Europe 1t­
selt. It seems to me that by reasonable al11ance 
w1th Br1taln, Franoe, Holland, Australia, and Canada 
the oontrol or sea and air can estab11sh a power
whlch never can b.e challenged by Russ1a and wh1ch 
can protect Europe as 1t has been proteoted now for. 
5 years through tear ot whfi sea and a1r power can 
aooomplish·against Russia. 
Even w1th such a tirm beliet 1n the m1ght ot sea and 
a1r power, Taft made 1t plain he still felt there was a need 
tor a profess1onal army. Us1ng the opportun1ty to switoh 
from the Far East to Europe, he dld "not object to comm1t­
t1ng some 11m1ted number ot Amer10an divis10ns" to Europe 
provlded the Europeans themselves contributed a larger 
amol:lnt to NATO detense. He fUrther caut10ned that suoh a 
program "never ought to be a key pO.1nt ln our overall m111­
tary strategy. n19 St111 t whatever h1s 1ntent10ns, his 
statement s1gnlfying that some Amer1can troops in Europe 
would be permissible was to prove to be a source of diffi­
culty to h1m 1n the oom1ng weeks. The lmportanoe ot h1s 
remark had not 'Peen lost on the Adm1n1strat10n. 
, . 19 Ibld•• p. 69. 
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Tattls apparent unswerving taith in 'air power was 
jolted m1dway through his speeoh when a senator triendly to 
the Admin1stration's pos1t1on ohallenged some ot his assump­
tions. Senator Paul Douglas rose to inquire why, 1t a1r 
power were such a panaoea, had it not turned the trick in 
Korea where the United States enjoyed complete air dominance. 
The Chinese were continuing to pusn baCk United Nations· 
t'oroea, and Amer10an a1r power was seem1ngly 1noapable ot 
stopp1ng them. Tatt was trankly forced to admit, tor the 
tirst time, that bombing alone ,was not gOing to stop an 
army. To Which Douglas asked: 
I 
Does it not tollow trom the Senator's statement that, 
it continental Europe does not build up a suft1c1ent 
army to oheck the Communists on the ground our threat 
ot bomb1ng from the air w111 certainly not stop the 
Oommunist armies it they w1sh to move into Europe'
MR. TAFT. Once war 1s deolared it will not stop 
the Oommunist 81"11es, no. 
MR. DOUGLAS. And will not the Commun1st armies 
therefore sweep through comp2etely to the EngliSh 
Channel?
MR. TAFT. Does the Senator think there would be 
any d1fference 1f we have 10 American div1s10ns 
there'? 
MR. DOUGLAS. That is sanething else. 
MR. TAFT. It 1s not someth1ng else aga1n. It is 
exaotly the question the Senator 1s asking. I am 
say1ng that the oommitment 01' Amerioan t~80ps will 
not substantially change that s1tuation. 
In this short encounter lay the rationale tor all the ver­
biage' ot both camps conoerning the mer1ts ot air power. 
Unfortunately; three months were t'o pass betore most ot theI, 
partio1pant~ tully rea11zed tb1s' tact. 
20~., p. 62. 
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The beliet in the invinoibility of air power was not 
an easy one to dispel among certain Republicans. The Repub­
lican minority leader, Kenneth Wherry, held to the opinion 
throughout the debate that air power was the "decisive" 
weapon in World War II and theretore would be in World War 
III also. He conceded that 11' war ,came to Europe, the 
United States would be unable to stop it, but the "Russian 
horde" would soon beoome llpowerless n because Amer1can bomb­
1ng would cr1pple Russian industry and agriculture at home. 
Reasoned the Nebraskan: 
, There is nothing un1que about trading space while 
gett1ng off knook-out -punohes by air and sea. It is 
not pleasant to oontemplate Europeans tak1ng another 
occupation, temporary though 1t may be, but there 
will be many more Europes lett, and more ot their 
1ndustr1es st111 standing, 1n that oircumstanoe, than 
it we wage ground war, w1th another inferno of guns
and tanks and bombs oonsuming Europe. It is a oase 
01' the lesser of two ev11s.2~ 
In other wor~s, .not only would massive bomb1ng 01' the Soviet 
Un10n br1ng about the end of Red aggreSSion, 1t would also 
save E?rope from the ph,s1oal destruot1on that would result 
from the olashing ot large ground arm1es. To engage Amer­
10an troops 1n such an "infernal 1n Wherry1e v1ew would be a 
"too11sh venture. a 
Taft, wh1le agreeing w1th Wherry, wondered 11' the 
1nferno oould not be' postp~ned altogether by not antagon1z­
ing the Sov1ets 1n the f1rst place. This could be qUite 
s1mply acoomp11shed by ~ inor~asing the s1ze 01' NATO 
: ' 
I 

I 

, 

I 
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forces. Otherwise, asserted Taft, "the bUilding up of a 

great army surrounding Russia from Norway to Turkey and Iran 

might produce a fear of the invasion of Russia or some Of 

the satellite oountries regard~d by Russia as essential to 

the defense ot Moscow.u2~ Understandably, the Soviets saw 

I 
the Situation in largely the same light ~nd 1ndicated that 
Tattle evaluation, at any tuture ground war was a correot 
one. The correlation between Tattle view and the Kremlin's 
Was duly noted by the Administration, and during the middle 
of the debate the State Department repr1nted--no doubt glee­
tully--a Tass report Which observed: 
~ven suoh an experienced reactionary as the Amer1­
can Senator Taft was reoent~v forced to adm1t that 
the plans which are be1ng hatched by the American 
aggressors for a War with Russia on the European
Continent by land forces are doomed to failure and 
f~~~s:rbt~V::i~~p~re~~~n~ ~t~~e~o~~cE;~;:d:~3be 
Taking a somewhat d1fterent tack, other conservatives 
argued that Europe must learn to stand alone. Senator 
Willlam E. Jenner offered a sample :dlagnosls: Europe would 
depend on th~ United States as a "crutch" as long as the 
"crutch" remain'ed aval1able. A limplng Europe lacked the 
"heart tt to.:.detend itselt. 24- Earller, Senator Edwin C. 
Johnson· had reported to his colleagues that trom what he had 
wltnessed tlrs~ hand and had been able to plece together 
22Robert A. Taft, A Forel~ Policy for Americans 
(Garden Clty: Doubleday & Oompany:' Inc., 1951), p. li;. 
23The Department or State BUlleti~~ .February 12,
1951, p.~O. ~ 
240. S.,congr~~sional Reoord, g2d Cong., 1st Sess., 
XOVII, Pa~t 2, 2601. 
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from others, the people of Western Europe d1d not th1nk war 
\vas imminent and consequently were livery calm and complacent 
about the whole thing. II This ,\-18.8 sO despite the tact that 
France and Italy were "teeming w1th comrnun1sm.1I Furthermore, 
1t hardly made good sense to send the Amer1can army to 
countr1es such as Germany s1nce 1t was lithe most pacifist 
country in the world. 1125 
Pac1fist or not, tor some Adm1n1strat1on opponents 
NATO would be lmpotent unless the participation of West Ger­
many was insured. Senator Joseph McCarthy went one step 
further and asserted that it did not make any difference 
whether the Un1t.ed States sent one or ten or twenty divi­
s10ns to Europe; the entire region would be lOst "w1thout 
. . 
the ~npower of Spa1n and Western Germany." Any plan that 
dld not 1nclude both of these countr1es would const1tute a 
"'phony defense .1126 
While most of the spotl1ght of publ1city was concen­
trated on the senate dur1ng the great debate, the House 
occas1onally d1d enter the fracas. M1d't-.ray through February, 
~ouse mlnor+ty leader Joseph ~~rt1n reluctantly conceded 
the. t Amerlca.. should provide equlpment Iland pos slblj" some ot 
the manpower II necessary for the defense of "[estern Europe. 
Stl11, he emphas1zed that the Ilfocal point" of Amer1ca's 
troubles was As1a, not' Europe. }artin warned he would use 
every resource at h1s command to counteract any Adm1n1stration 
25Ibid., Part 1, p. 497. 26Ibld., Part 2, p. 2397.
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strategy wh1ch 19nored ASia. 27 Two days later, llg of h1s 
fellow Repub11cans went even further. Offerlng somethlng 
called. a "Declaration of Policy," the group demanded "that 
the Un1~ed States concentrate its m1litary efforts on defend­
1ng the Western Hem1sphereo and cease,supply1ng a1d of any 
k1nd to Western Europe unless that area 1ndicated a w1ll1ng­
ness to carry n1ts ful~ share of the burden. n2S Just pre­
oisely what a ·'full share' of the burden II const1tuted re­
malned oloaked in ambiguity. A def1n1tion was hardly neces­
sary, however, s1nce the actual purpose of t~e manifesto was 
to drum up publicity and pressure for the Tatt poslt10n in 
I "-­
11ght of the fact that Senate hearlngs on the l~sue were 
slated to commence t~e follow1ng day. 
Truman' s ResE~ 
Whlle .Taft and his support,ers oontinued to attack 
Amerloa's defens1ve posture, the Admlni~tratlon was far from 
. 
1nactive. On January g, 1950 Pres1dent Truman delivered his 
annual State of the Un10n address and left 11ttle doubt as 
to Where the Admi~1strat1on stood 1n regard to the troops­
to-Europe 1ssue. P01ntlng out that NATO oonstltuted the 
IJheart" of Amer1oa's defense, he declared that 1t was also 
I'the basls for def'ense of the wno:+e free world. II The al11­
I 
ancs oould not be abandoned, for it lt were, lt would mean 
\ 
27The New York Tlmes, February 13, 1951, p. 24. 
2~Ib1d., February 15, 1951, p. 1. 
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the "loss ot the largest workshop 1n the world. • • • Stra­
tegically, econom1cally, and morally the defense of Europe 
1s part ot our Olm defense. 029 The speeoh was generally 
applauded both at home and abroad. The Br1t1sh seemed par­
t1cularly 1mpressed and The T1mes commented ed1torially: 
No democrat1c leader has set out so simply before 
the ~uty whioh now falls upon eaoh and upon all. The 
connexion between the United States and Europe is a 
partnersh1p 1n self-help and self-defenoe. There i8 
no question here of paymaster and pensioners or sat­
el11tes. Each has to g1ve, for 1ts own peaoeful sur­
v1val and progress, 1ts due share, aocord1ng to 1ts 
resouroes, to the grand design ot suocessfully deter­
r1ng attaok, tor the f1rst t1m'e 1n history, by the 
prompt and suff101ent Show of peaoeful strength.
The safety of Amer10a and that of Europe, as the 
Pres1dent sa1d~ are-one. The Pres1dent has set a 
high standard•.lO 
Dete~m1ned not to be overshadowed by Truman's address, 
ihe Repub110an d1ss1dents sought pub11c1ty of the1r own on 
the very day ot h1s speeCh. Senator Wherry oounterattaoked 
by 1ntroduo1ng a resolution that would attempt to stymie the 
Pre,s1dent I s troop proposal: IIResolved, That 1 t 1s the Sense 
ot the Senate that no ground toroes ot the Un1ted States 
should be ass1gned to duty 1n the European area':tor the pur­
poses of the North At1ant1c Treaty pend1ng the formulat10n 
ot a polley w1th respect thereto by the Congress.~3l 
29Fred ~. Israel (ed.), The State of the Un10n Mes­
sages ot the Preslden~~ (New York: Chelsea House, 1966), 
III, 2979. 
30The T1mes (London), January 9, 1951, p. 5. 
31U. 8., Oong~essional Reoord, SEnd Cong., 1st Sess., 
XCVII, Part 1, ~~. 
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Eventually the resolutlon would surface ln modltled form, 
but tor the tlme belng lt was all but 19nored by those con­
cerned as both sldes seemed s~tlstled to oontlnue to debate 
trom the tloor of the Senate. 
Tatt's attaok ot Administratlon polley on January 5 
was answered ln klnd by several pro-Admlnlstration,: senatore 
on January 15. Spearheadlng the ettort was Senator Douglas 
ot Illinols, who warned that the 1 sSues lnvolved ln the 
great debate Were ubroader than the survlval ot any pollt­
10al phl10sophy." The whole future ot western olv1l1zatlon 
ltselt was at stake, aooordlng to Douglas. Atter pay1ng due 
homage to the cultures ot Asla, he sought to defend the 
Adm1n1strat10n I s role ,ln Europe by reminding his oolleagues 
ot the greatness o,t, western clvlllzatlon, albeit somewhat 
bombastically: 
.•• Mr. Presldent, lt is ln the West, lt ls among
the heirs ot a clvilizatlon cradled ln the Medlter­
ranean and nurtured in the northern fastnesses ot 
Europe, that the dignity, the worth, and the rights 
ot the indivldual man have been most strongly asserted. 
To tne people ot the West, 11te ls dear, and lt 0ught2not to be sold tor something that is not dear.' 
He went on to argue that by being unWilling to send troops to 
Western Europe, the United Stat~s would be more likely to 
cause a Russian attack rather than prevent one. The Rus­
slans had never been known to "spare' any country beoause it 
was weak, olaimed Douglas. EUrope needed Amer1can d1vi­
sions not beoause these divisions by themselves would halt
.' 
32illd ., p. 243. 
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any ,:future attack, bu t because" they would act as lithe vi tal 
increment which would to a great extent create the Wil11ng-
ness ot Weste~n Europeans t~ enlarge their armies." Fur-
ther, it the Un1ted states d1d not' increase 1ts toroel ,1t 
would probably cause the European po'tfers to do likewise and 
oould well lead them to "throw 1n the sponge."3; 
Senator Estes Kefauver agreed With Douglas and rose to 
add that in his view the soviet Union was "bent on world 
oonquest, It and 1ts weapons were lI'propaganda and brute 
torce~"34 A Republican, Senator Wayne Morse, oonourred: 
The danger that the Soviet Commun1sts Will resort 
to war to advance their imperia11st1c a1m 1s of the 
utmost grav1ty and real1ty. There 1s no doubt what-
soever that Commun1st 1mper1alism is out to spread 
,over the world--over Europe and Asia by indirect 
aggress10n 1:f'3POSS1ble, ultimately, I think, by war 
if' neoessary. , 
Morsels statement was clearly meant to be in support 
of the Administrat1on's posit1on. Nor as a·Republican was 
he alone in tak'1ng suoh a s~anoe. Taft was simply' unable to 
oonvince a number of fellOW Republicans that Truman had mis-
read the importanoe of ;,the European defense pioture. Such 
laok ot po11tical cohesion did muoh to explain why Tart was 
ultimately unable to' win the great debate. 
One ot Tart IS tou'gheat an tagonlsts turned out to be 
Republioan Governor Thomas Dew'ey of' New York. In early Feb-
ruary Dewey made it plain he supported a joint a1r-sea-
ground defense of Europe, ~~d that the deployment of such 
33~., p. 239. 3~b1d., p. 261. 35~. , p. 257. 
torces would require no approval from Congress. Troop 
deployment, ·argued the Governor in what, h~d to be a clear 
slap at Taft, "was a job for experts and not tor po11t1­
c1ans."36 The follow1ng even1ng (February 12) Dewey went 
even further in his support tor NATO. He was quot~d as 
advooat1ng the al11ance "be extended along the Med1terranean 
Sea and beyond 1ts eastern shores as a means of re~uc1ng the 
land area upon which Russ1a m1ght have des1gns for aggres­
sion."37 In other words, Dewey was seek1ng the 1nclus1on ot 
Greece and Tur~ey 1nto NATO'. 
Dewey's statements_!'1ere among the strongest uttered by 
one Repub11can aga1nst another dur1ng the course ot the 
debate. St1ll, h1s remarks were not 1ndicat1ve or a s1mple 
two-way sp11t 1~ the party. An analys1s by W1ll1am S. Wh1te 
near the conclusion of the debate in late March tound the 
Repub11oans. had hopelessly splintered into no less than tour 
'fact1ons, With some overlap occurr1ng on many or the 

p01nts. 3g .The picture emerg1ng, then, was 'that at Tatt 

unable to rally the major1~y ot h1s own party beh1nd h1m 

with the ~anks ot the Demo~rats rema1n1ng almost so11d. 

Many ot the votes that Tart 'had hoped to garner were 
lost during the ,t1rst half of February when the Adm1nistra­
t10n made a determ1ned etfort to squelCh his arguments once 
,'. 36The New York T1mes, February 12, 1951, p. 1. 

37~., February 13,1951, p. 1. 

3.gI.b1d., March 31, 1951, p. 4. 
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and for all. The oft~ns1ve began on a low key when General 
Eisenhower returned from Europe and reported to a Jolnt scs-
I 
slon of Congre~s hls observatlons ot European defense. The 
General stressed'equlpment, not men. He pleaded that West­
ern Europe be s~pp11ed wlth the latest mi11tary hardware 
avallable to 1nsure Europe's 'soldlers would not be out­
gunned by thelr Soviet counterparts. Almost ln passlng he 
added: PI believe that the transfer of certaln of our unlts 
should be in direct ratl0 to what Europe ls dolng so that we 
know that we are all golng forward together, and no one ls 
suspiclous ot the other. H39 
The return of Eisenhower was qulCkly followed by a 
serles ot j01nt hearlngs held by the Senate Forelgn Rela­
tions an,d Armed Servlces Oommlttees ln whlch key mll1tary 
and forelgn\affalrs personnel testlfled. Secretary of 
Defense George C. Marshall opened by reveallng for tbe flrst 
t1me on February 15 exactly how many addltlonal troops the 
Adminlstratlon was proposlng to send to Europe: 
We already have there, on oocupatlon duty, about two 
'dlv,lalons of gr,ound foroes. Our plans, based on the 
reoommendation of the Jolnt Chlefs of Staff, there­
fore contemplate send1ng four addltional dlvlslons to 
Europe. ' 
Whlle thls number does not appear to represent ln 
pure flghtlng power a large oontrlbutlon to the 1m­
medlate defensive strength of Western Europe, lt 
does represent a small Army unlt of hlgh efflclenoy
and, we belleve, a tremendous morale contrlbutlon 
39u• 8., Oongress10nal Recor~, S2d Oong. 1st 8ess., 
XOVII', Part 1, 575. . 
\ 
to the etfectiveness4Snd build-up of the projected
ground foroes. • • • 
What Marshall did not say was that such a relatively 
smal~ torce would undoubtedly oatoh the Taft foroes un­
awares, whioh it did. ~att and hi. supporters had been 
expectlng Marshall to propose a tar larger toroe than he 
dld, posslbly somethlng ln the nelghborhood of ten divi­
slons. When he asserted only four would be needed tor the 
time belng, he ln e:rfect spr~ng a subtle t'rap on the Tatt 
forces: only a week before Tatt hlmself had oonfessed' he. 
was prepared to allow "a tew more dlvlslons" to Eu~ope With­
out debate. SpeoitloallY,'on February g Taft had sald: 
IIWlth regard to the sending ot troops to Europe wlthout any 
oommltment no doubt the Presldent has power to send divl­
slone to OocuPY Garmany, whloh it ls our obligatlon to 
pollce and defend. But lt oan hardly be claimed that this 
power would Justlfy sendlng more than two or three addl­
tlonal diVlslons. d41 The Admlnlstratlon slmply lncreased 
Taft t f:I three divlslon tl gure by one and then took the posl­
tlon 1 t was really sending about the' same number he was 
wllling to· allow anyway. \nth thls one apt maneuver the 
Admlnistratlon, and Marshall and Acheson ln partloular, had 
cleariy outflanked Taft. Years later Acheson oonfessed: 
4oTh!peEartm!~t ot State Bulletin, Febr~ary 26,1951, 
p. 	329. 
41U. s., Congl\esslopal Record, p. 1119. 
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W1th the Pr'esldent I B consent, General Marshall 
revealed in public testimony what the Administration 
had in mind., It was tour more divisions, making a 
total of six. Neither he nor General Bradley would 
be led into making that number a oeiling. It was 
at the time, the meeting point of need and convenl-' 
enoe; that po1nt could in the future move up or 
down. They refused to speoulate. Senator Taft was 
neatly oaught. IIA tew" 'frlaS more than two, three 
anyway, Which reduoed the great strateg10 issue, as 
had been stated by Presi.dent Hoover--ot holding the 
oceans by air and sea power versus involvement on" 
land--to an argument over one division to Europe.~2 
Acheson went on to relate that onoe Tatt realized "his 
predicament, ',. he attempted to overcome it by 'shifting the 
1ssue,at stake in the deba~e. His "new pos1tion," ola1med 
ACheson,. was one or challenging the Administrat1on's r1ght 
to send any humber ot divisions Without the approval ot 
Oongres,s. Here Aoheson's reliability must be called to 
question. Tattls "new pos1tion ll was not Il n·aw" at all; it 
was one ot the many issues he had linked to the debate over 
troops right along. It 'may well have been that atter Aohe­
son and Marshall sprang their tr~p Tatt was rorced to shift 
gears; but he oert.ainly did not bring up issues that he had 
not already introduced. Tp.e question ot Oongressional 
approval was one, that Tatt had harped, on since the very 
beginn1ng ot the debate, and he would continue to argue this 
point until almost the very last. 
In anY' even,t, the Administration continued to press 1ts 
oase hard. The very day atter Marshall I s testimony. the, 
42Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: 
W. W. Norton & Company, 1969). p. 495. 
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Ohairman of the Joint Chi'ets of Statf, General Omar Bradley, 
voiced the view~hat add1t1onal Amerioan troops were neces­
sarr to reassure the Europeans ths Un1ted States intended to 
belp them defend themselves. Furthermore, Bradley oon­
oluded, II this' increase in colleot1ve m1litary strength 1s 
needed as a deterrent to the aggressive intentions ot Soviet 
Russia'. u43 
Bradley I a remarks Were to llowed with1n a 'lew days by 
statements trom the oountry's three highest ranking air 
foroe, navy, and. army off! oers. ,All three ot them agreed 
with the Admin1stration 1 a proposal and all ooncurred that 
air and sea power could not alone be counted on to save 
Europe from RUBs1an ocoupation.44 Senator Wherry, Who had 
been invited to sit 1n on the testimony although he was not 
a member of either partioipat1ng oommittee, ~ried to preas 
the Army Ohief of Statt, General J. Lawton Oollins, into 
admitting it would be better to rely on "pulver1z1ng" the 
Sov1ets with'atomio bombs than on oomm1tt1ng Amer1can troops 
to Europe. General Collins "persistently reJeoted suoh a 
theory, say1ng to Senator Wherry that no amount ot bombing 
ot the Russ1ans oould keep them from occupying Europe and 
that bomb1ng alone oould never beat them. I,45 
43The Departmen~ of Stat~Bull~t1n, February 26, 1951, 
p. 331. ­
~he New York T1mes, F'ebruary 20, 1951, p. 1. 
45~., p. 5.. 
6; 
Administration critics regained some hope when. the 
·commanding general of the St- ~teg1c Air Command General 
. , 
Curtis E. LeMay, Was called to appear. LeMay testitied that 
while'he agreed with the Presidentls decision to send tour 
more div181ons~ he also believed that allot the torces 
contemplat~d \ tor Europe's defense at that time would','not be 
adequate to stop a Russian invasion. In the general's mind 
these divisions wo~ld represerit a "holding torce~H while the 
"main blowlt would h,ave to come. from strat egic bombing. 46 
LeMay, then, ot all. the military officers called to testity 
before the two committee~_, was the only one who even came 
close to su~porting the Taft theSiS. But even he did not 
advanoe the possibility that any future war in Europe could 
be won by air and sea power alone. 
Attar questioning and listening to the various gen­
erals, Senator Wherry. still was not satisfied. He com­
plained trom the Senate floor late. in March: "The dominant 
voioes in the Pentagon, General Marshall, General Bradley, 
and General Collin's, all ground officers by training, have 
their eyes glued to the ground, when they should wake up to 
the aeronautioal tacts ot lite. Our air power is the chiet 
. 4<7 
deterrent to World War III.R 
Other senatbrs were even more upset by the military 
testimony. They viewed the oommittee hearings as a sham, 
46~., February 22, 1951, p. 1. 

~1u. S., Oon~essi~nal Re~, Part 3, p. 2907· 
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feeling the generals were bound to say whatever they were 
told to say. Of E1senhower 1 s inspeot10n and fact-f1nding
,1 
! tr1p to Europe, for 1nstanoe, Senator George W. Malone 
blustered: 
The purpose rot the tr1p] Was obv10usly to seoure 
support for a !ec1s10n whioh was tully deoided upon
beforehand. I do not believe that anyone 1s na1ve 
enough to th1nk a week or two jumping from one . 
European oapital to another, oould aooomp11sh any 
purpose other than that ot propaganda tor the pre­
oonoeived deoision ot the State Department t04!end 
our boys to make Up a Mag1not 11ne in Europe. 
Malone, Wherry, and a tew others were making a po1nt, but it 
Was a point born ot frustrat1on'rather than rea11ty. It Was 
ot oourse difficult to know preo1sely how muoh ot the mi11­
tary testimony refleoted the,aotual thoughts of the generals 
and how much of 1t had besn "preoonce1ved" by the Adm1n1stra­
t1on. What Malone and Wherry refused to admit, however, was 
that it was the duty ot these off·lcers to follow the dio­
tates ot the1r Commander-in-Ch1ef; if they had truly opposed 
. 
his mi11tary and po11t1cal dec1sions, they should have 
resigned. 
!he Acheson Test1monl . 
The h1gh water mark ?f test1mony tavorable to the 
Adm1n1strat10n 1 s pos1t1on undoubtedly occurred on February 
, 
. 16 when Dean Aoheson read a long prepared statement in wh1ch 
·1 he oaretully out11ned the need tor addit10nal troops in 
Europe. It was to beoome the Adm1n1strat1on's det1nit1ve 
.4g~., Part 1, p. 952.. 
ever be' expected to send substan­
less perma­
answer to that 
This 
inoreasingly to haunt him for the 
short-range 
It was almost 
to testify regard­
But this time he was 
Oomm1ttee on Fore1gn Rela­
;. 
/ 
statement on the 1ssu·e. 
Aoheson's remarks were awaited with greatest ant10ipa­
tion by his senatorial foes. Muoh of this was due to the 
symbo11c quai1ty assoc1ated w1th'h1m; whether he wanted to 
be or not, he had. beoome 1n the minds of many the Ilohief 
arohiteot" of the Truman foreign polioy. Hls enem1es were 
also fond of reoal11ng that on a similar oocasion in 1949, 
Acheson had committed one of the major blunders of his 
career. When asked at that time by Senator R1ckenlooper, in 
conneotion with the or1ginal rat1flcation of the NATO paot, 
1f the Unlted States would 
t1al nwnbers\ of troops to Europe lias a more or 
nent contr1bution, II Aoheson replied: "The 
questlon, Senator, is a olear and absolute INo.,1149 
unfortunate response was 
next two years. His,. opponent s would ~ot let him torget 1t. 
He Was later to oand1dly adm1t! ".Even as a 
prediotion th1s answer was deplorably wrong. 
equallY stUP1d. lI5Q Now' onoe aga1n he was 
lng NATO, and naturally his opponents were hopeful of 
another errorln judgment, one that would prove fatal to 
both NATO and the Seoretary of State. 
to disappo1nt t.hem. 
4eu. 5., Congress, Senate 
t10ns, Hearinglt on the North Atlant10 Treaty, Slat Cong.,
1st Sess., p. • 
5PAcheson, p. 285. 
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( 
Baslcally, Acheson framed hls 11ne of attack With the 
same reasonlng.the generals had employed,betore the same 
committees. He argued the Unlted States had to depend upon 
a "balanced collective force. n And 'whl1e he frankly oon­
ceded that tor the present Amerioa enjoyed a Psubstant1al 
. lead in air power and in atomlc weapons," thls advantage 
would gradua11y be lost over a perlod of leal'S. It was 
therefore important to continue to deter aggresslon after 
this advantage had been dlmlni~ed. The only way to do so 
would be with a balanced force that had as much m11itary 
muscle on the ground as on the sea and 1n the air. He went 
on to note that crlt1cs had labeled such a program as 11lu­
s10nary because its foroes s1mply could not be made large 
enough to offset those of the Soviet Union. The trouble 
I
with auch reasoning, he asserted, Was that it oonvenlently 
separated Eu~opean defense from the rest of the American 
d~fense network. European defense foroes oould not be con­
sidered in 1solat10n, as a weapon all by themselves; rather, 
they had to be seen as a "v1tal adjunct to the other' deter­
rent torces ava11able." 51. Summing U!?, he renewed this plea: 
In the event ot an attaok the availab1l1ty ot defense 
forces in Europe would. g1 ve us time that we would 
Vitally need to bring our other forces into opera­
tion. In the meantime these. defense torces would 
oblige the aggressor to.use up hls available re­
.sources, while his home sources of supply were 
being bombed. These forces would also deny him 
51Dean Acheson, "The Joint Detense ot Western Europe " 
The DeRartment of State Bulletin, February 26, 1951, p. 324. 
access to the industrial, human, and other resources 
of Europe. These are the resources that balance the 
scales of power. These are the forces that would 
prevent Europe, ln the event of an attack, trom hav­
1ng to go through another occupat1on and llberation. 52 
Acheson's presentation l~S on the whole a masterful 
performanc6# one that left his crlt1cs with little new to 
assault. Of course they could not and d1d not accept his 
arguments, but ne1ther could they tind anything weak enough 
in them to win over those' senators wb:o had been up to that 
time noncommlttal on the troop issue. Clearly, 
tary·a test1mony was a tour 
the Secre­
In 
Ineutral­
once 
54Ibld•
-
de force, an accompllshment 
which effectlvely sealed the fate of the entlre- debate. 
/ 
retrospect, however, his case was not wlthout flaws. 
Early in his r~marks, for example, Acheson cautloned 
his audience by suggest10ng that the danger confrontlng West­
ern Europe was not just the obvlous one of overt m1l1tary 
a.ggresslon. There were also sev:eral other threats': 
..• conquest by default, by pressure, by persua­
sion, by sub'l(erslon, by "neutralism, II by all. the 
paraphernalia of lndirect aggression which the'Com­
munlst movement has used.53 
If the Unlted States engaged in a sort ot one dlmena,lonal 
strategy whlch 19nored these other factors, then it could 
only be expected that 'such a policy would drlve "our frlends 
ln Europe lnto a mood of non-reslstance, a mood ot 
ism, I which 1s for them and tor all of us a short cut to 
suic1de. ,,~\ Acheson's successor, John Foster Dulles, 
53Ibld., p. 32:;. 

I I 
referred to neutra11sm as being "1mmoral" and was subjected 
to such a fusillade of verbal br1ckbats that he never 
troubled to b~oach the subject w1th such terminology again. 
Yet, oddlY', no one thought to challenge Acheson I s groundless 
assumpt10n. Presumably, even his opponents thought sU1cide 
to be an accurate predi~tion of the fate ot neutral 
countr1es • 
. The poss1b1lity that Europe would somehow be "sub­
verted l• by internal Communist movements was also extremely 
remote 1n 1951, desp1te what Acheson sa1d. Indeed, with1n 
one month ot h1sstatement, h1s own Depa.rtment of State had 
1-' 
1ssued stat1stics which cast serious doubt on such a poss1~ 
b1lity. After explaining to the reader that Moscow 't;as 
"losing the battle to take Over Western Europe by boring 
from with1n," an official commun1que stated that since 194-6 
Communist party membersh1p had declined by 34 per ~ent 1n 
Austr1a, 30 per cent 1n France, 31 per cent 1n Italy, 65 per 
cent 1n No~waYJ ~ per cent 1n Western Germany, and 34 per 
cent 1n the United K1ngdom. 55 But once aga1n, 1n so far as 
1s known, not one of the Admin1stration's conservative oppo­
nents.. attempted to nake an 1ssue ot th1s apparent 
disorepancy. 
55110ommun1sm on the \I[ane 1n ~lestern Europe, II The 

Department ot state Bullet1n,.I4arch 12, 1951, p. 40~ 
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~enate Resolut1on 22 
Atter the Senate Fore1gn Relations and Armed Foroes 
Comm1ttees had sat through most o·t the month of February 
listening to and questloning Dean Aoheson, George Marshall 
. 
and a.. bevy ot generals, it beoame obvious most s ena tors had 
made up their minds in favor at the Administration's pro. 
posal. Indeed, the deols1on ot the Committees was unani­
mous. By a vote of 23 to' 0 they elected to leave the govern­
ment " . tree to oommlt l<lhatever fo'rces were tneoessary and 
appropr1~tel" to uphold Amerioals t.air share of the NATO 
effort.55 T~uman had overpowered Taft and his allles and it 
nOl~ seemed only a matter of time before he would go ahead 
and order the tour addltional divisions to'Europe. The 
debate oontinued trom the tloor ot the Senate for approxl­
. mate:;t.y 'a month, but' as the days drifted by it beoame lnoreas­
ingly obvious that .few people were really paylng attent1on. 
The whole Ta.ft-Wherry-Knowland effort seemed to dislntegrate 
after the hearings oonoluded. 
A politioal autopsy 'at the debate quickly reveals why. 
At best Taft 'was able to count bnlonly about one-thlrd ot 
the Senate to see the' matter his way. Not'all of the remain­
ing two-thirds were necessarily on the slde at the Admln'la­
, . 
tratlon, but neither was Taft able to win them over. The 

big tactor was hls lnabl1ity to tind any professional 

5~The New York Times, March 9, 1951, p. 1. 
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military men who would Champion his views. (MacArthur ot 
course was still in Korea, but he took no d1rect part 1n the 
great debate.) 'Without some m1litary support, Tattls pos1­
tion beoame unt~nable. As one opserver has summar1zed: 
. Faced with exeout1ve unanim1ty and the staunch 
defense ot the Administration's position by three ot 
the nation's tour most popular soldiers (Marshall,
Eisenhower, Bradley), the opposition senators failed 
to det1ne any olear alternatives to the Adm1nistra­
t10n's aotion, muoh less to influenoe or to reverse 
the character ot that action.57 
The tinal act of the great debate ooourred on Apr1l 4 
When the Senate; by a vote of 69 to 21, approved Senate 
Resolut1on 99. The resolution had first squeaked through 
,,_ .... 
two days earlier by the th1n margin of 46 to 44, but a 
coa11tion reported to be composed of Repub11cans and South­
ern Demoorats rorced the Senate to reoons1der and to adopt 
a deolaration subm1tted by Senator John L. McClellan ot 
Arkansas. 5't! The MoClellan amendment, whioh turned out to be 
a stipulat10n call1ng upon the Pres1dent to seek congres­
s10nal approval for any further troop inoreases to Europe, 
was adopted by 49 to 43. It 'was then attaohed to the full 
resolution which passed by a final· tally ot some forty-e1ght 
votes. The resolution wh10h thus emerged Was the ult1mate 
outgrowth or the one Senator Wherry had first 1ntroduoed 1n 
January. It had, ,however, b~oome so amended over the months 
51samuel P. Hunt1ngton, The Oommon Defense (New York: 
Oolumb1a Univers1ty Press, 1961), pp. 324:;25. ­
5~The ~ew York T1mes, Apr11 3,'1951, p. 1. 
, 
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that \'lherry himself could no longer support it. On the 
other hand, Taft and Knqwland viewed it as the best possible 
under the circumstances and voted tor its adoption. Others 
may have been puzzled' over Just what it did,. but voted for 
1t anyway. As t.,ith most measures that eventually work their 
\t18.y through the legislative proces.s, Resolution 99 came 
tnrough as a comprom1se l one, as'Dean Acheson later remarked, 
that "had 1n it a,present for everybody".1t Acheson's comment 
would seem to explain the resolution's flnallopslded 
aoceptance. 
The resolut1on l being just exactly that, vOlced the 
sense of the Senate and had absolutely no leglslative power. 
It approved the selection of General Eisenhower as the Com­
mander ot NATO; it noted the existence ot a threat to the 
secur1ty of the United States and its NATO partners which 
necessitated comm1tting units of "armed Forces as may be 
necessary and proper" but warned that not more than four 
d1v1sions should be deployed IIwithout further Congressional 
approval II ; it noted the President should consult lr1th the 
Seoretary of Defense, the JOint Chiefs, and appropr1ate con­
g.ress10nal committees before sending troops abrcad; it asked 
the JOint Chlets to ascertain 11' other NATO members were 
providing the1r oontribut1on; it requested semiannual 
reports on the implementation ot the NATO treaty; and 1~ 
asked that considerat10n be given for the in~lusion 01' West 
I 
I 
I 
II 

i j 
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Germany and Spain lnto the paot,.Sg 

As there was no actual leglslatlon, lnvolved, the 

. 
Adm1nlstratlon could have 19nored the resolutlon entlrely j 
had lt so deslred. Instead, it wlsely Chose to acoept lt as 
IS vlotory. The Presldent !asued a statement ~h1ch sald in 
part: 
The clear endorsement of the appolntment or General 
Elsenhower and the plans to assign troops to his com­
mand shows that there has never been any real questlon
but that thls country would do its part ln h~lplng to 
create an lntegrated European defense toroe.b9 
In an editorlal on the same ,day, The New York Times 
optlmlstlcally repor~ed: I1Even with 'its amendments • . . 
the adoptlon of the resolutlon should provlde l"estern Europe 
wlth new confldence to go tull steam ahead Wlth the defense 
programs agreed upon. K61 ~he T1me~' edltors apparently had 
not been doing thelr homework; Western Europe by this date 
was paying 11ttle attentlon'to the outcome of the great 
debate, so 1nvolved had lt beoome with its own difficulties 
over NATO. ,France, clinging to bitter memories fostered by 
Worl~ War II, remained wary over the role West Germany was 
to play ln the alllance. Other members, Great Brita1n in 
partioular, had become disturbed ,over the lncreased costs 
NATO would mean. By the spring of 1951, regardless of the 
59The resolutlon ln lts entlrety'may be round ln the 
Appendlx. 
P~The DeEartment of State Bulletin, Aprll 16, 1951, 
p. 637· -­
61llTroops for turope, It The New York Times, Aprl1 5, 
1951, p. 2S. 
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outoome o~ the great dtbate, Europe indioated little likeli­I! 
hood. of proceeding at "full stea,m ahead. II It soon became 
olear that the transformation of NATO into any meaningfulII 
m111tary a111&006 was to be an agonizi,ngly slow prooess. 
In the United!~tates, tOOt another matter soon 
diverted attention. Within a week of the passage of Reso-, 
lut10n 99 the entire affair was momentarily forgotten fol­
i 1 	 lowing the President's removal of General MaoArthur from his 
! 
! 
I 	 oommand. Unoffioially, the great debate was now over, but 
I 
II! 
, '1 	 the fresh oontroversy wh1ch arose from'MaoArthur's .dismissal 
indioated some of the disputed issues oould not be resolved 
by the passage ot a congress1onal resolut1on. 
CHAPTER IV 
AN APPRAISAL 
~he great debate. then, d1d not really conolude w1th 
, . 
the passage of Resolut1on 99 on. April 4. To be sure, the 
qUest10n whether tour addit10nal divisions would be sent to 
-' 
Europe Was settled. but ·the question whether Europe or ASia 
had first priority in Amer1ca l s defensive strategy continued 
to be hotly debated. With Truman's dismissal ot MacArthur 
the Whole affair was opened anew, more vociterously than 
ever. The resulting uproar was to last well into the summer 
ot 1951 and the consequences of this hectic period were to 
haunt the Truman Adm1nistration until its last days in 
otfice. Yet the debate itself had grappled with, or cre­
ated. a number ot 1mp'ortant 1ssues, some of wh1ch Were to 
help formulate American foreign policy for the next fifteen 
years. The debate's effect on the 1mmadiate future of the 
I 
Repub11can and Democratic parties was also not~ble. 
The Q,uestion of the Soviet Thr.eat 
During the debate muoh of what Taft, Hoover, Knowland, 
and others protested concerned ~he quest10n ot the pee~ for 
additional troops 1n Europe. It will be recalled ~hat Taft 
in particular argued that he could tind no sign the Soviets 
were preparing any overt military aotion against Western 
Europe. In his mind the threat Which ex1sted was in the Far 
.75 
East. Olearly, the results of the debate show the Adminis­
tration won the argument, at least in so tar as a majority 
of the Senate was concerned. Yet what is not olear, even 
after a hiatus ot some nlneteen years, is Whether lts evalu­
atlon was sound. Was there, in taot, any serious possibil­
lty of a Soviet invaslon of Western Europe during the early 
1950's? 
The only tact that can be stated fQr certain is that 
there was a climate ot tear and suspicion prevalent in the 
Unlted states. Thls in itself was probably enough to CaUBe 
the Administration to assume an attack would occur. The 
flndings ot, the National Security 'Counci~, as relayed in lts 
paper NSO-6g, were undoubtedly an important contributing 
taotor. Unfortunately, this entlre paper still remains 
classified, even though less than one per cent of it origi­
lnated from class1f1ed sources. Acoording to Dean Acheson, 
this'informat1on put the need tor a stronger alllance Dbeyond 
argument." At best, then, the hard evldence tor the neces­
sity ot sendlng American tor~es to Europ'e Was based upon a 
super secret port1on of NSC-6g. Until this information is 
I 
declassified, it seems doubtful any tinal conclUSion can be 
reached in r.egard to the posslbility of a SOViet attack dur­
~ng this per10d. 
lDean Acheson, Present at the Oreatlon (New ~ork: 
W. W. Norton &Oompany, 196~', p. 375. 
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The Role ot the Troo~s 
Taft had also argued that even 1f a Soviet attack oame, 
six Amer1can d1visions would never be capable of stopp1ng 
. it. Tatt's view in this 1nstance seems sensible. Even With 
addit10nal divisions-supplied by the various nations ot 
Western Europe, lt 1s stl1l diffioult to understand how a 
massive Soviet 1nvas1en could have been conta1ned. In 
answer to th1s po1nt Administrat10n supporters, such as Gen-
eral Luo1us Clay, sought to assure the Senate that an Ameri-
can foroe, even su~h a sm~l one, would be so sk11led and 
tenac10us that it would be capable or sustain1ng "the rather 
slow moving Russian attaok" until additional allied torces 
oould be brougnt to bear.2 In light of the American mi11-
tary's less than br111irutrecord against a tar less soph1s-
ticated opponent 1n Korea, Clay's statement seems part1ou-
larly absurd. 
A more plausible e~lanat1on tor the sending ot troops 
hinged on a polit1cal motive. At least one oolumn1st saw 
the long-term 1mplioations of the issue at the t1me: 
In the most, 11teral sense they [the six d1visions] 
are the vanguard ot a potent1al army t~at m1ght never 
have oome 1nto ex1stenoe if they were not there. As 
a military·foroe they are not b1g enough to w1n a 
land war, but as a political torce, the nuoleus at 
larger arm1es, the generator ot con~1denoe and the 
will to resist, they oould be a potent faotor in 
. 2The New York Times, MarCh 1, 1951, p. l6. 
\ 
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aav1ng the peaoe. 3 
S1m11arly, another observer noted, perhaps more succinctly, 
that Amer1ca 1 s role 1n prov1d1ng troops to NATO was, 1n 
effect, II a deterrent 'commitment based on the beliet that 1t 
Ameri can 1nt ent10ns to prevent the upset ot the European 
balance of power were made olear 1n advance, the 11ke11hood 
I of a challenge to that balanoe would be greatly reduced. 14 
I 
I 
f 
More recently, other lfr1ters, including some tram the 
'II~ i so-oalled "revis10n1st" scho~l of h1story, have come up With 
! 
I 
1 a related motive tor the Admin1strat10n's act10ns. Th1s 
! 
group 1s ot the op1n1on that Amer1can troop~ were primar1ly 
sent to Europe to serve as -hostages- in order to 1nsure 
all-out Amer1can part1c1pation 1n case ot any m111tary con­
f11ct. Specifically, the reasoning ot th1s group 1s Just 
the oppOsite of what General Olay's had been: small numbers 
ot Amer1can troops would never be able to w1thstand any 
massive Sov1et attack, nor were they meant to! Their role 
was to act as a, ·"tr1pw1re" whose purpose would be to guar­
antee the tull m1ght of the Amer1can m1l1t~ry would come 
orashing down on any torce wh1ch attempted to rout them from 
the oont1nent. Ultimately, ot course, th1s meant that Many 
SoV1et attaok upon a NATO command oonta1n1ng American troops 
3Anne OtHare McOormiok, liThe Po11t10al Miss10n of Those 
'S1x D1v1sions,' !he New York Times, February 17,1951, p. 14. 
4Samuel P. Huntington, The Oommon Detens2 (New York: 
Oolumb1a Univers1ty Press, 1901), p. 3IJ: 
J "'" ..,£S!t!!l!I~ 'H'''': ....CW¥;i-:y«i""" '!'M"...,.,..'..,..,....... ; ....._,,-,..... ......,...-.....
- ________ """" .... -'"'IIIW-'!"!'L'!"l'i&.i:!".! .. ~U~·i''7'"!'':_'___ ""-.-._""":..,  ...,..... ............. -.... _,-,_ --­
would automatically trip a nuclear attack trom the Unlted 
States. 1I 5 
In other words, the loss ot a slzeable number ot 
Amerioan soldiers, coupled with the realization that ada­
. 
quate numbers ot additional troops oould not be despatched 
tast enough trom the United States to hold the contlnent, 
would probably be r'eason, as one observer put lt, to II cre_ 
ate the-oasus belli atomlc!, at whlch point the Strategic 
Alr Command would take over and unleash an atomlc attack. a6 
This theory seems oredlble, espeo1ally s1nce at least 
one hlgh-level member of the Truman Adm1nistratlon has been 
-
unable or unw1lling to respond to it.7 What emerges trom 
all of thls, however, is the ourious irony that 1t the logio 
ot the revision1sts ls aocepted, ,then in the end the Adm1n­
1strati on !!!. relying on the oapab1llty of the Amerioan Air 
force to deliver a devastatlng nuclear attack on the SOViet 
I 
Unlon, the strategy Taft ·had advanced all along. Taft 
I I
Il
. I l.,anted .the United States to be prepared to carry out th1sI I I 
1, 
St'lalter LaFeber~ America., Russia, and the Cold War. 
I I 1945-1966 (New Y~~k: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), 
Ii 	 p. l23L ' 
'I 	 'I , 	 PRaymond Aron The Great Debate (New York: Doubleday1 	 J& Company, 	 Inc., 1905), p. 23. ' Ii 

l 
 7When asked ab~ut the revision1st theory by the 
1 author Seoretary Aoheson referred him to several chaptersI in his' new 	book Present at the Creation. All proved to beI usetul but none -unforiunate!y, dealt with the rev1sionist; i 
"triPwire" 	explslllition. Nor could the author find evidence 
I j 	 of a response to the theory by any other Administratlon 

defender.
I j 
• 1 
I 
~ 
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actlon wl thou't sacr1flo1ng ground personnel 1n the prooess. 
The Adm1n1stratlon, on the other hand, apparently ~~lt that 
suoh ~n attaok would never rece1ve the polltlcal and pub11c 
assent necessary Within the United States unless Amer1can 
troops had already been k1lled by a Sov1et aggressor force. 
Both strateg1es'assumed Amer1can air power would have the 
capabl11ty to carr.y out such a ~1ss1on. Fortunately, the 
a1r torce was never asked to prove this content1on. 
The Execut1ve and the Senate 
In question1ng the ~res1dentts r1ght to send troops 
anywhere w1thout the approval of the Senate, Taft and his 
supporters were-employing a tact10 that was anything but new. 
He was merely st1rrlng up embers which period1cally through­
out Amer1can h1story have ign~ted over the const1tutlonal 
question of the right or the exeout1ve branch to take mili­
tary act10n w1thout the approval of the legislat1ve branch. 
Truman, already annoyed w1th Tart and oompany over a 
variety or 1ssues, saw little need to subm1t the troop ques­
t10n tor their approval. The President made h1s posit1on 
olear 1n a press conferenoe in January, 1951: 
Q.. Mr. Pres1dent, maybe 1t t s my "t1n II ear, but 
I d1dn't get th1s stra1gnt yet. In, th1s part10ular 
case, with the d~bate rag1ng 1n Congress over 
whether you do or do not have the author1ty to send 
troops to Europe--and Mr. Hoover sald not another 
man or another dollar shou14 be sent--the debate has 
been qu1te general. Do I understand that you will 
ask Congress for perm1ssion-­
THE PRESIDENT. No. 
Q. -~before send1ng troops-­
gO 
THE PRESIDENT. No, you do not want to take that 
View ot the thlng. I sald that--ln case ot neces­
slty and lt beoame neoessary, for the defense ot the 
Atlantl0 Treaty oountries, the Oongress would be 
consulted qefore troops were sent. I don't ask 
the1r E~rmlsslon! I just consult them-raffiphas1s
added). --- Lom, , 
Truman went on to note ln the same news oonference that 
it Senators Taft and Wherry, or anyone else, wanted to 
discuss this matter with him "the tront door of the Wh1te 
I 
House (was J always open." A publio invitation ot this sort 
was not w,hat 
\ 
Tart had 1n mind. He desired a pr1vate invlt~-
, 
tion whereby he and the Presldent would arr1ve at some 
mutual arrangement ·1n regard to the troops question. In 
tact, the whole not1on that 1t was Trumants duty to gain the 
consent of Oongress really meant the oonsent of the GOP 
leadershiP.9 As 1t was, Truman said nothing at his plans 
conoerning the troop lssue to the Republloan leadership 
until after a declsion had already been made and oommun1­
oated to the other NATO member~. Truman's actions were a 
olear ind1catlon the harmonious days when the President and 
Senator Arthur Vandenburg worked out a bipartisan foreign 
po11cy were nothing more than fond memories. It seemed 
olear, as one observer has noted, that "the procedures and 
guo s., Pr,es1dent, "The Pres~dentls News Oonference ot 
January 11 1951,u ~ubliQ Pape£s of !~e P~es~dents Ofgth§~~!ted State~1--Har~. ~ruman (Washington: Un1ted tates 
906011 V. 'Crabb, B1~tls'ai1 r9.re~B!! Pollcy:._ ,Mzth or/1 Realltl' (Evanston: Row, Peterson and ~ompany, 1957), 
1 p. 91iO. ­
I 
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r 
t 
I I 
! 
I 
! ! 
gl 
teChn1ques designed to promote t~o-party cooperation in for­
eign 'affairs had fallen into almost complete disuse, and 
neither the Administration nor Republican leaders showed any 
evident desire to restore them. ulO 
The reaction in the Se~ate to the President'a policy 
was mixed, even in his own party. Senator J. William FUl­
bright was firmly in his corner: 
!l:he Congress has the right and power to raise the 
Armed Forces, but the President has the responsi­
bility for the command of those forces. If in the 
exeroise of his best judgment the defense of th+s 
oountry requires the sending Of troops to Europe,
he has the power and the duty to do so. Congress,
of oourse, can refuse to appropriate the money for 
the troops but that is a deoision for which Con­
gress must take the re~onsibi11ty. In the long 
run deois1ons PO military strategy are best left to 
the Executive.~l. 
Senator Paul Douglas, normally an Administration 
baoker, Was not so sure. He felt uneasy over the troop 
issue because Seoretary AoheSon had stated before a oongreB­
sional oommittee in 1949 that Amerioan troops would never be 
sent to Europe under the NATO paot. Now it was obvious 
troops were going to be sent and apparently without oongres­
sional sanot1on. ·Consequent~y, Douglas felt: 
••• it would not be proper, in my judgment, for 
the administration now to try 'to put the agreement
into etfect by purely Executive act10n upon the nar­
row grounds of its oonst1tutional powers. For.~o do 
, so would violate the explioit pledg~ given by '::~::: 
lOIbid.
-
llU. S., Oongressional Record, g3d Cong., 1st Sess., 
XCVII, Part 1, 520-521. 
S2 
the Secretar.y to the Senate when we had the pOwer or 
refusing to ratify the treaty under Which the Brus­
sels agreement was later negot1ated. It would be 
the path' of honor instead for the adm1n1strat1on to 
submlt the question of approv1ng the Brussels agree­
m~nt to at ll~st the S~nate and poss1bly the 
House. • • '. 
In the end Truman chose a compromise, but one which 
Was tav6rab~e to hls position. With the Admln1stration's 
approval the lssue Was allowed to be a1red 1n the jo1nt 
hearlngs ot the Armed Forces and Forelgn Relatlons Commit­
tees. Slnce both commlttees were made up of men largely 
tavarab~e to the Adm1nistration l s pos1tlon, thls action 
almost 1nsured a pro-Adm1nistration outcome, thereby neatly 
outmaneuverlng Taft. The mowe also had the additlonal 
advantage ot pac1fy1ng d1ss1dent Democrats, such as Douglas, 
who now telt the Senate had been properly consulted. 
Tattls allegatlon that the Senate had not been given 
1ts const1tutional due was further weakened when many promi­
nent Republicans, ,convinced by the hear1ngs, tinally voted 
for Resolution 99. Thls avo1ded a Showdown struggle 1n the 
Senate whlch probably would have resulted in a bitter par­
tisan wrangle ot considerable duratlon~ But because ot 
Truman's apt handling ot the issue and because of the sup­
posed Soviet threat to Western Europe, many "Republican
I, 
senators dld not dare to r1sk the consequences of defeatlng 
I 
i the treaty. nl3 Some at them were probably teartul of 
l2IblC!. ~ p. 230. 
l3Malcolm E. Jewell, Senatorlal Polltlcs and Forelgn
Pol1ol (n.p., Unlversity of-Xentucki~ess, 1962), p. 38. 
I 
! i. 
g~ 
talli'ng v1ctim to a II soft ~n oommunism" oharge at some 1st er 
date' if they refused to support a mi11tary alliance aga1nst 
it at this time. 
Aftereffeots 
The long term 1mplications.ot the great debate tor 
both internal American politics and foreign affairs are 
adm1ttedly difficult to surmisel On the surface, as has 
already been shown, the Adm1n1strat'1on was v1ctorious. It 
sucoeeded 1n its des1re to move addit10nal troops to Europe, 
a move wh1ch turned out to be a th1n enter1ng wedge in l'1ght' 
ot the numbers of American troops which were to follow over 
the years. 
A broader examinat1on, howe~er, suggests the debate, 
along with those issues whlch led~ up to and followed it, 
proved to be d1sastrous to the Democratic Party. For 
although some oonservative Republ1cans were earnestly seek-
1ng a 'change 1n America's defense posture, it seems olear 
that 1n a larger sense they saw the great debate as yet 
another opportunity to make political bay for the 1952 eleo-
tions. Every time the Administration was d1scredited, the 
Republ10an Party was assured ot addltional votes. One care-
ful student of the period, histor1an Ronald J. Caridi, has 
frankly oonoluded this/was the major motivation of the 
Republican d1ss1~e~ts. Commenting on the party's attitude 
toward Korea in part1oular, Caridi remarked:-
Critio1sm 
dis­
the 
It 
As one foreign 
Dean 
a 
on the 
forelgn 
so 
(Phl1adelphla: 
g4 
They first ~upported the American intervention, 
then retreated trom the implioations of that sup­
port; they st~adtastly called for Amer10an W1th­
drawal • . • ~hen passlonately assooiated tnemselves 
wl th the "no substitute for viotorytl philosophy ot 
MaoArthur. Finally .•• the party nom1nated tor 
the Presldenor a military hero lfhoae plattorm lacked 
any concrete program tor peace even as 1t d1savowed 
both uniticat~on and an all-out victory.
by the Republican party dur1ng the Korean War Was 
'justi:fiable; ;rut When the nature of a party 1 s 
sent 1ndlcate,s that lt s members are motlvated more 
by polltlcal lexpedlency than by 'a deslre to present 
a oonslstent iand vlable alternative to A~lnlstra­
tlon pollcles, then censure ls ln order. 
Oensure may have been ln order, but when lt came 
Amerlcan publlc, vla the ballot box, dlrected lt agalnst the 
Demoorats. The Repub11can Party's electlon vlotorles ot 
i 
1952 lndlcated that lts strategy had been successful. 
may, ln fact, have been too suocesstul. 
observer has noted: "Not only dld lt do untold eleotoral 
damage to the Democratl0 Party but lt lald the basls for a 
slgnlfloant change 1n Amerloan [torelgn~ polloy. N15 
Acheson, wrltlng ln hls memolrs, admlts the perlod was 
pOlsonous one and lt "had a highly toxlc etfeet 
Amer1can public~u Stlll, he found that the "loss of oonfl­
dence at home and ab~oad ln the conduot of our 
a~talrs was ,not the prox1mate oause of any Change 1n our 
torelgn pollcy, but lt added to our d1ff1oult1es and by 
14aonald J. Caridi, The Korean War and Amerloan Poll­
1;Ies: The Republlcan Partz as a Case s~ 
Un1vers1ty ot Pennsylvanla Press, 1968), p. 175. 
15The Times (London), September 6,1954, p. 7. 
" 
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i dolng dlmlnlshed our etteotlveness.u16 
Perhaps there was no notloeable ohange ln the direotlon 
of forelgn polloy dur1ng the remalnlng year and a halt ot 
the Truman Admlnlstratlon, but a subtle ohange was oocur­
rlng. A whole set of attltudes oonoerned wlth the menace ot 
Oommunlsm ln Asla began to permeate the upper eohelons of 
government. Korea, ot course, started lt, but the attacks 
and campalgns of Taft, Hoover, Knowland, and thel~ followers 
must Share a good deal ot the responslbll1ty for that 
change. Largely because of the momentun of the1r propa­
i' ganda, Amer1can fore1gn po11cy beoame reorlented, with a 
!I
, greater emphas1s placed upon the 1mportance of As1a. Once 
the war·in Korea was term1nated w1th a state of permanent 
truoe,.the Un1ted States d1d not remove its presence from 
•! 
AS1a; 1t 1noreased it: fifty thousand troops rema1ned 1n j Korea; Ch1ang Kal-shek cont1nued to receive vast amounts ot 
; j m111tary and econom1c aid; the French were f1rst a1ded and 
• I eventually replaced ln a hopeless attempt to suppress IIQom_ 
r 
munlst subvers1on,!1 ln .Southeast As1a; and the SEATO al11ance 
system was estab11shed ln an effort to do for the ent1re 
reg10n what NATO had supposedly done for Western Europe. 
In short, the whole concept of combatlng Commun1sm by oon­
ta1nment, wh1ch had or1ginally been 'deslgned tor events in 
Europe, was also a40pted for Asia under the dlreot1on of the 
16Acheson, p. 52S. 
E1senhower Adm1nistration. Later Democratic regimes not 
only adcepted all of this as worthwhile but sought to expand 
America's role there as well. No thought was apparently 
given to the posSib1lity that by so do1ng th,e Un1ted States 
m1ght ser1ouslY'ove~extend 1tself. 
In essence, then, most o.L' the argument:s 1n regard to 
As1a advanced by Tart and h1s troupe were a~cepted and 
eventually put 1nto pract1ce by later adm1nistrat10ns. 
(~ven the much touted super10rity of a1r power was given 
another chance in Vietnam--where it met wit4 only marg1nal 
success.) The irony ot the great debate wa~ that while Tart 
and h1s supporters lost tbe battle 1n 1951 over the troops­
to-Europe 1ssue, they 1n ettect won the war". As1a Was to be 
championed as never before, perhaps beyond any~hing Tart had 
1magined poss1ble. Aside :from the troop 1s,sue, the 'only 
concept advanced by Taft and Hoover during ~he great debate 
that was not later aCknowledged ,as gospel was ~he proposi­
tion that excessive defense spending woUld become selt­
destructive. Yet this may well bave been ~heir most sign1r­
1cant prediction. 
! • 
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as may be 
APPENDIX 
SENATE RESOLUTION 99 AS AMENDED 
" 
Resolved That-­
1. the Senate approved the aotion ot the President ot 
the United States in oooperating 1n the oommop defensive 
effort or the North Atlant10 Treaty nations by designat1ng, 
at their'unanimous request, General ot the Army Dwlght D. 
E1senhower a~ Supreme Allled Command:er, ,Europe, and 1n plac­
ing Armed Forces ot the Un1ted States in Europe under hie 
oommand; 
2. it ls the bellet ot the Senate that the threat to 
the seo~rity of the Un1ted States and our North Atlantio 
Treaty partners makes 1& necessary tor the United States to 
• .#' 
station abroad such unit's ot our Armed Forces 
necessary and appropriate to contribute our ta1r share of 
the forces needed tor the j01nt defense ot the North 
Atlantic area; 
3. 1t is the sense ot the Senate that the Pres1dent' 
of the Un1ted States as Oommander in Chief ot the Armed 
Forces, betor~ taking aotion to send units ot ground troops 
to Europe under art10le 3 ot the North Atla~t1c Treapy, 
should oonsult the Seoretary ot Defense and the J01nt Ch1ets 
of Statt, the Oommittee on Foreign Relations, ot the Senate, 
the Oomm1ttee on Fore1gn Affairs ot the House of Representa­
t1ves, and the Armed Servioes Oomm1ttees ot the 'Senate and 
92 
the House of Representatives, and that he should likewise 
oonsult the Supreme Allied Commander, Europej 
! 
4. it is the sense of the Senate that betore sending 
unit 0' of ground troops to Europe under «rtiole 3 of tbe 
INorth Atlant1c Treaty, the Joint Chiefs of Statf , shall oer­
tity to the Seoretary of Defense that in their opinion the 
parties to the North Atlantio Treaty are giving, and have 
agreed to give ~ull, realistic foroe and effect to the 
requ1rement 'of article 3 of said treaty tha.t "by means of 
continuous and etfective self~elp and mutual a1d" they will 
IImalntain and develop their individual and collective capa­
oity to resist armed attaok," especiallY inso.tar as the cre­
ation of combat unit,s is oonoer~edj 
5. the Senate herewith approves the understand1ng
, I that the major contribution to the ground forces under 
j I 
General Eisenhower's command'should be made by the European
. I 
members ot the North Atlantic Treaty, and that such units 
ot United States ground forces as ma.l be ass1gned to the 
above command Shall be ass1gned only atter the J01nt Chiets 
ot Staff cert1fy to the Seoretary ot Defense that in their 
opinion such assignment is a necessary step in strengthening 
the secur1ty of the Un1ted States; and the certified op1n­
ions reterred to in paragraphs 4 and '5 ,Shall be transmitted, 
by the Secretary of Detense to the President ot the United 
States, and to the Senate Committees on Fore1gn Relations 
and Armed Services, and to the House Committee on Foreign 
.... 
11~1i.1 il , I.... "" 
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Affa1rs'and Armed Serv10es as soon as they are reoe1ved-, 
6. 1t 1s the sense of the Senate that, 1n the lnter­
ests ot sound oonstltut1onal prooesses, and of national 
un1ty and understandlng, congresslonal approval should be 
obtalned of any pollcy requ1ring the assignment ot Amer~oan 
troops abroad when su~h assignment 1s 1n lmplementat10n ot 
artlcle 3 ot the North Atlant1c Treaty; and the Senate 
hereby approves the' present plans ot the Presldent and the 
Jolnt Ohlets ot Statt to send tour additlonal dlvls10ns ot 
ground toroes to Western Europe, but lt ls the sense ot the 
Senate that no ground troops ln addltion to such tour dlvi­
slons should be sent to Western Europe in implementatlon ot 
artiole 3 ot the North Atlant10 Treaty Without further 
oongresslonal approval; 
, i. it 1s the sense ot the Senate that the Presldent 
should submlt to the Congress at lntervals of not more' than 
6 months reports on the implementation of the North Atlantio 
Treaty, inoluding such information as may be made aval1able 
tor thls purpose by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe: 
g. 1t ls the sense of the Senate that ~he Un1ted 
States should s~ek to ellminate all provlsions ot the exlst­
ing treaty wlth Italy whloh lmpose llmitations upon the 
m1l1~ary strength ot Italy and prevent the performance by 
Italy ot her obligatlons under the North Atlantio Treaty to 
oontribute to the full extent of her capaoity to the defense 
of Western Europe; 
" 
• 
\ 
9. it 1s the sense of the Senate that oonsideration 
, ' 
should be given to the' revision ofplans for the defense ot 
Europe as soon as possible so as to provide tor ut1,11zat1on 
on a voluntary baals'of the. military and other resouroes ot 
Western Germany a~d Spain, but not exolusive ot the m1l1tary 
and other resouroes of other nations. 
I 
